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ABSTRACT
The three essays in this dissertation examine questions in the U.S. Treasury bond mar-
ket and an asset-pricing anomaly in the stock market. They are unified by the theme
relating quantities of assets with asset prices. These essays challenge the notion that be-
cause financial markets are highly liquid, quantities of (demand or supply) do not matter
for predicting asset prices.
Chapter 1 examines the time-varying impact of the US Treasury debt supply on bond
risk premiums. I find that the elasticity of bond risk premium with respect to supply de-
pends on the correlation between stock and bond returns. An increase in the supply of
Treasury bonds raises the required bond risk premiums, but the effect is stronger as stock
and bond returns become more positively correlated. I interpret this evidence within the
context of a preferred-habitat asset pricing model where the arbitrageurs are the marginal
investor for all bond maturities. Arbitrageurs demand higher compensation for maturity
risk when the stock-bond correlation is positive as bonds are poor hedges for stocks. On
the other hand, when the correlation turns more negative, an increased bond supply in-
duces low or even negative risk premiums. The findings have practical implications for
understanding the impact of the impending Federal Reserve’s unwinding of its $4.5 trillion
bond portfolio.
Chapter 2 documents new empirical stylized facts about the postwar U.S. Treasury
debt management policy. In particular, I document the puzzling fact that the US Treasury
has tended to historically issue more long-term debt when the term spread is greatest.
I propose a simple model that captures the practical incentives and constraints faced by
the Treasury debt manager. The debt manager seeks to minimize borrowing costs while
managing rollover risks. I calibrate the model to generate a measure of time-varying roll-
over risks faced by the U.S. Treasury.
Chapter 3 investigates the earnings announcement premium puzzle in Finland. Be-
tween 1999-2002 and 2006-2009, I find that stocks with earnings announcement earn
excess returns over non-announcement stock in the 2 week window before the announce-
ments that quickly dissipates post-announcement. Moreover, I find that the premium is sig-
nificantly higher and persistent through a 30 day window around the financial statement
xi
releases. I find no premium around the interim earnings report and in fact accumulative
losses. I also assess the relationship between announcement premium and trading vol-
ume. Using an administrative transaction-level data set, I find some supportive evidence
for the attention-grabbing hypothesis. I find a positive correlation between the announce-
ment premium and the net-buying trading volume among individual investors, especially
around the financial statements.
xii
CHAPTER I
When Is The Supply Effect Large In The Government Bond
Market?
Abstract
I examine the time-varying impact of the US Treasury debt supply on bond risk premi-
ums. I find that the elasticity of bond risk premium with respect to supply depends on
the correlation between stock and bond returns. An increase in the supply of Treasury
bonds raises the required bond risk premiums, but the effect is stronger as stock and bond
returns become more positively correlated. I interpret this evidence within the context of a
preferred-habitat asset pricing model where the arbitrageurs are the marginal investor for
all bond maturities. Arbitrageurs demand higher compensation for maturity risk when the
stock-bond correlation is positive as bonds are poor hedges for stocks. On the other hand,
when the correlation turns more negative, an increased bond supply induces low or even
negative risk premiums. The findings have practical implications for understanding the
impact of the impending Federal Reserve’s unwinding of its $4.5 trillion bond portfolio.
JEL Codes:
Keywords: Treasury supply, bond risk premium, QE, stock-bond correlation
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1.1 Introduction
With the Federal Reserve’s decision to unwind its Large Scale Asset Purchase program
and Congress’s tax reform, there will likely be big changes to the supply and the maturity
structure of the government debt.1 Market participants are keenly interested in how these
changes will affect interest rates, asset prices and the economy. A series of papers since
the 2008 financial crisis have found that increasing Treasury supply, either by an increase
in the dollar value or a lengthening of the duration of the bond portfolio held by the
private sector, raises the expected returns of government bonds.2 However, the studies
that look at long time series evidence have generally assumed a constant demand elasticity
for bonds. Yet there is evidence that that the demand curve for Treasury bonds has shifted
significantly over time, which could in turn significantly affect the strength of the Treasury
supply effect.3
In this paper I show both empirically and theoretically that as the stock-bond return
correlation becomes more positive, bond risk premiums respond more strongly to an in-
crease in supply. In standard asset pricing theory, there is no role for demand and supply
factors. For these factors to matter, there needs to be some degree of market segmentation
or imperfect asset substitutability. Greenwood and Vayanos (2014) lays out the theoretical
intuition for how supply shocks may affect bond prices. Preferred habitat borrowers issue
bonds with an inflexible maturity structure. They pay bond risk premiums to risk averse
arbitrageurs for absorbing the bond supply. Supply changes the price of interest rate risk
because it changes the sensitivity of the arbitrageurs’ bond portfolio to short term interest
rates. In their paper, the only traded assets are a continuum of maturity of bonds. I enrich
and extend their analysis by observing that if the arbitrageurs hold stocks as well as bonds,
then the strength of the supply effect can depend on the time-varying hedging properties
of bonds against stocks.
The stock-bond correlation influences the sensitivity of bond risk premium to supply
because it tracks government bonds’ hedging properties almost in real time. Campbell,
1July 6, 2017, FT Alphaville. Richard Koo, the chief economist of Nomura bank observes that the QE
unwind will be economically equivalent to issuing new Treasuries to finance fresh deficits. When the Fed
stops reinvesting principal payments from maturing Treasury securities, the Treasury Department will have
to pay the bonds’ face value to the Fed. Since the federal government is not running a surplus, this is money
that the Treasury does not have. The Treasury department will then have to market new Treasuries to private
investors to fund the Fed’s redemption.
2See Greenwood and Vayanos (2014), Hamilton and Wu (2012) and D’Amico and King (2013) for surveys
of the theory and empirical estimates for the Treasury supply effects.
3Because a supply effect is the result of a movement along an imperfectly elastic demand curve, time-
varying supply effects and time-varying demand elasticities are equivalent and hence may be used inter-
changeably.
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Sunderam and Viceira (2017) shows that increasing stock-bond correlation, which indi-
cates higher covariance between nominal and real assets, is associated with higher bond
risk premium. Specifically, they interpret the changing stock-bond correlation more funda-
mentally as a change in the covariance between inflation and the real economy. As inflation
goes from being carriers of bad news for real output growth to goods news over the last 30
years, nominal bonds have also become better hedges for stocks.4 The contribution of this
paper is to point out that the supply factor and the covariance factor as drivers of the bond
risk premium actually reinforce each other. As bonds become better hedges for stocks, the
arbitrageurs will require less risk premium per unit of supply, vice versa.
I provide empirical evidence by regressing bond risk premiums on the new bond supply
using data from 1961 till 2016. The bond risk premium is the difference between a long
term bond yield and the average expected short-term interest rate that investors expect
to prevail during the life of the bond. It is normally interpreted as the compensation for
holding long-dated bonds and withstanding interest rate risk. Since market expectations
are not directly observable, bond risk premiums are also unobservable and must be es-
timated. In the baseline I use a popular off-the-shelf bond risk premium measure from
Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013), which gauge expectations statistically by estimating
an affine term structure model on bond yields. I construct the bond supply measure with
new issuances over the following 12 month period. Specifically, the bond supply is defined
as the maturity weighted total face value of issuance over the nominal GDP.5 Uncondi-
tionally, there is a positive relationship between bond risk premiums and supply but it is
not statistically significant. However, once I control for the stock-bond correlation, I find
that the supply effect becomes more positive and statistically significant. Moreover, there
is also a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term between
the supply and the stock-bond correlation. This indicates that the supply effect is stronger
when stock and bond returns are more positively correlated or when bonds are poorer
hedges for stocks.
The regression has a causal interpretation if the supply measure was exogenous to bond
risk premium shocks. However, patently the quantity of government debt supply does re-
spond to risk premium shocks such as business cycle risks. Treasury issuance closely follow
deficitis, which are highly countercyclical. The maturity-weighted issuance to GDP ratio is
mechnanically the product of the weighted average maturity of the issuance portfolio and
4Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) makes a similar observation where they argue that the compensation for
inflation risk of nominal bonds should depend on the extent to which inflation is perceived as a carrier of
bad news.
5I will discuss in greater details below why I choose to focus on issuances rather than the entire stock of
debt. It suffices to say that the result is robust to using the stock of debt.
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the issuance to GDP ratio. As a result, the supply measure, like deficit to GDP ratio, should
rise during recessions and fall during expansions. On the other hand, the required risk
premiums near business cycle troughs are high and low near the peaks. Therefore there is
a natural endogeneity in the regression. I address the endogeneity issue by instrumenting
for the supply measure by the weighted average maturity of issuance while controlling for
the quantity of debt. The empirical results remain quantitatively similar. The weighted av-
erage maturity (WAM) of issuance is a valid instrument because the government’s maturity
choice in the short run is exogenous of market bond prices. Indeed, Garbade and Ruther-
ford (2007) as well as Hou (2017a) both document evidence that the Treasury manages its
issuance and repurchases to achieve a target maturity of the outstanding debt. It does so
by issung a balanced amount across the maturities while tilting toward the long maturities
only when the debt to GDP ratio rises.6
I present a modified preferred habitat term structure model to formally articulate the
theoretical intuition of the empirical results. I add to the Greenwood and Vayanos (2014)
model by allowing investment in stocks. As in the GV model, there are two types of
agents in the bond markets: the preferred habitat (PH) borrowers and the risk-averse arbi-
trageurs/investors (Arb). The PH borrowers, which the US Treasury is one by assumption,
have a certain maturity preference for her debt issuance and are relatively insensitive to
interest rates. For example, the US Treasury, for the purpose of maintaining market liq-
uidity and others, have a preference for issuing a balanced amount across the maturities
rather than concentrating issuance in the maturity with the lowest interest rate. The Arb
investors on the other hand seek to maximize the mean-variance of his portfolio returns,
comprising of stock, bond and the risk-free rate returns. If the only available assets are
bonds and the risk free asset, the Arb demand risk premium for absorbing net supply of
bonds as compensation for taking on additional durational risk.
I modify the GV model to allow investment in stocks too. I make a key assumption
of slow moving investment capital across asset classes. One way to think about this as-
sumption is as follows. Institutions that perform the arbitrageur role, e.g., trading desks or
hedges that rely on funding from brokers, are part of a business that is intrinsically exposed
to the stock market risk (or business cycle risk for each the stock market proxies).7 They
6Incidentally Bhandari et al. (2017) shows theoretically that this policy is actually optimal as in it max-
imizes social welfare. In fact, since 1970 the Treasury has made an explicit commitment to a ”regular and
predictable” issuance schedule and eschews ”tactical issuances”.
7Duffie (2010) first started investigating the implications of slow movement of investment capital. Green-
wood et al. 2017 build a preferred habitat model with slow-moving capital across asset classes where they
allow the Arb investor to adjust partially. They find asset prices exhibit an overreaction to supply and de-
mand shocks in the short run that dissipates in the long run. In that spirit, our papers have a similar stance
on market structure.
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cannot easily shed their exposure to stocks without exiting their business. Therefore under
this assumption, the Arb investor, unable to quickly adjust her stock positions, must evalu-
ate the additional durational risk of the new bonds against their hedging value for stocks.
If the bond returns co-vary positive with stock returns, the required bond risk premium
will be a sum of the duration risk compensation and the covariance risk compensation.
The covariance risk premium will be increasing in the risk aversion of the Arb investor and
the quantity of stocks held by the Arb investor.
Relations to literature. This paper belongs in a nascent literature on the effects of de-
mand and supply factors in asset markets, which is a part of the larger limits-of-arbitrage
literature. It also nests in a literature that tries to connect bond risk premiums with fun-
damental economic drivers. In the first category, because this is the first paper to identify
a time-varying risk premium elasticity of bond supply so to speak, the closest papers are
those that study the effects of demand and supply shocks in bond markets. Motivated by
the policy implications of quantitative easing, there has been a strand of literature that has
studied the effects of changing Treasury supply or the composition of privately held Trea-
sury securities outstanding. Greenwood and Vayanos (2014) (henceforth G&V), which is
the closest to this paper in spirit, writes down a preferred habitat model and empirically
shows that increasing Treasury supply raises bond yields and bond excess returns. How-
ever, their paper only considers bonds and do not investigate the time-varying properties
of the supply effect. Greenwood, Hanson and Liao (2017) considers a model of partial
market segmentation and limited arbitrage and demonstrates how theoretically demand
and supply factors can lead to “overreactions” asset prices. The theoretical environment
of their paper is very similar to ours but their paper still only deals with the ”level” of
the supply effect and not the sensitivity of the supply effect to higher moments of asset
returns. Hamilton and Wu (2012) structurally estimate a discretized version of the G&V
model and find that Treasury supply measures can help predict bond excess returns. A few
papers also look directly at the effects of flow measures of supply. Beltran et al. (2013)
use an instrumental variable approach to estimate the impact of foreign capital inflows
into US Treasury market on long term yields and find that a decrease in foreign inflow
raises long yields significantly. D’Amico and King (2013) use the G&V model as motivation
to estimate the response of the Treasury yield curve to QE1 purchases. This paper is re-
lated to a strand of the macro-finance literature that tries to link bond risk premiums with
macro fundamentals. Ang and Piazzesi (2003), using an affine term structure model with
fundamental factors, finds that a significant portion of the variability of the yield curves
is explained by unobserved latent factors. Ludvigson and Ng (2009) apply dynamic fac-
tor analysis to a rich set of factors and finds macro fundamental factors are essential for
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explaining the (counter-)cyclicality of bond risk premiums.
1.2 Data and Measurements
1.2.1 Data Sources
I obtain the data on Treasury debt primarily from the CRSP Treasury database for
the years from 1958 onwards. The dataset contains monthly snapshots of all Treasuries
outstanding and includes bond prices, security issue characteristics as well as other special
features. The CRSP database obtains the Treasury quantity and issue information from the
Monthly Statement of Public Debt (MSPD), which are publicly available from the Treasury
website. The CRSP datasets contain numerous instances of entry errors (especially on
quantity outstanding) and other mistakes. I manually verify the CRSP datasets against the
MSPD records and manually correct any mistakes identified. The bond prices in CRSP are
obtained from either GovPX or the New York Fed as detailed in the CRSP Treasury manual.
I supplement the CRSP Treasury dataset from prior to 1958 by manually inputting the
quantities of the marketable securities from the MSPD. I further obtain bond prices from
the archival records of the Wall Street Journal.
Zero coupon bond yields are obtained from the Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright (2006),
the bond risk premium series from Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013) and Kim and Wright
(2005). These are all maintained and updated daily on the Federal Reserve board website.
For the calculation of the stock- bond return correlation, I obtain the S&P 500 total return
index and the 10-Year Treasury bond return index series from the GFD (Global Financial
Data) database. All other macroeconomic time series are downloaded from FRED.
1.2.2 Measurements of Key Variables
In this section I explain the measurements of key variables used in the empirical anal-
ysis: 1) stock-bond correlation; 2) Treasury supply; 3) bond risk premium.
Measuring Stock-Bond Correlation
The stock-bond return correlation is the key state variable in this paper that reflects
the investors’ time-varying demand for Treasury bonds. A simple and nonparametric way
of constructing the correlation is by calculating a 60 month moving realized correlation
between the monthly total returns of the S&P 500 index and the monthly returns of a
ten-year Treasury bond. Figure 1.1 depicts the evolution of this correlation over the last
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Figure 1.1: Correlation of Stock and Bond Monthly Returns: 1900-2016
The correlations are obtained from the S&P 500 total return index and the Treasury 10 year bond index at
five year moving windows. The data comes from Global Financial Data Inc.
100 years. The stock and bond correlation is highly persistent but has experienced several
abrupt sign flips, notably mid 60s and late 90s. Contrary to the conventional financial
advisorial wisdom that stock and bonds are inherent risk hedges, stocks and bonds have
actually moved together more often than moving in opposite directions.
A chief concern about the moving window correlation is that it ignores autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity of returns. Stock returns, and to a less extent bond returns, are
known to have GARCH type of volatility. The strong autocorrelation of monthly stock-
bond correlation can be a result of autocorrelated volatility. We can address this concern
by estimating correlation using the dynamic conditional correlation method proposed in
Engle (2002). In this approach, we model stock and bond returns as a multivariate GARCH
(1,1) process. A comparison of the correlation is plotted as below. It turns out that the 60
month moving correlation is not that different from the DCC estimates. They are highly
correlated. Between 1905 and 2016 the two estimated series have a correlation of 92.1%
and since 1961 they are 95.4% correlated. For the baseline results, we will use the DCC
estimates. However, it is perhaps unsurprising that the empirical results are very similar
using either measure.
In this paper, I do not investigate the fundamental drivers of the stock-bond correlation.
I only point out its importance and usefulness as a state variable. However, given its
centrality in the paper, I would be amiss not to discuss the likely drivers of the variable and
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how the bond supply effect is related to these more fundamental drivers. There is presently
only a very small literature that has looked at the stock-bond return correlation. In the
asset pricing literature, stocks and bonds are typically priced separately. In the smaller but
resurgent portfolio choice literature, higher moments like the variance and covariances
of asset returns are typically assumed to be constant. A notable exception and recent
paper to tackle this topic is Campbell, Sunderam and Viceira (2017). They argue that
the stock-bond correlation is driven by the evolving relationship between (permanent and
temporary) inflation expectations and the real economy. Campbell, Sunderam and Viceira
(2017) use the stock-bond correlation to obtain information about the correlation between
real and nominal assets (and between real activity and inflation), which in turn cause time
variations in BRP. Whereas Campbell et al. focus on the inflation risk premium component
of the BRP, we focus on the supply risk premium component whose time variations are
driven by the covariance risk of bonds. Li (2002) analyzes the stock-bond correlation in
a statistical asset pricing model and identifies the uncertainty over expected inflation as
the primary driver. Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) also identify the relationship between
inflation and the real economy as an important factor. They show in a general equilibrium
model with recursive consumer preferences that negative covariance between inflation and
real growth news gives rise to an upward sloping nominal yield curve and significant term
premia.
Treasury Supply
Treasury supply is defined as a maturity-weighted sum of new issuances (MWI) nor-
malize by the nominal GDP. Unlike many papers in the literature that treat the outstanding
stock of US Treasury debt as supply, I view the new issuances as a superior gauge of the
Treasury department debt supply policy. Because the US Treasury has rarely bought back
its debt or exercised early redemption, it primarily exercises control over its debt portfolio
by adjusting the new issuances. From the market’s perspective, the new issuances are also
most relevant for the adjustments of arbitrageurs’ portfolios. This is particularly true for
long term bonds because older bonds are normally shelved and held through maturity by
long term investors. Most of the trading in the bond market is on the newer issues. Older
bonds are less frequently traded and relatively more illiquid.8
For new issuances, I include all new debts issued in the following 12 months. I measure
issuance ”forward” or near-future issuances because Treasury issuances are normally well
8Krishnamurthy (2002) documents the Treasury bonds that have been issued for some time tend to have
a discount compared to newly issued bonds of the same time till maturity. It attributes the price difference
to the difference in liquidity quality between old and new bonds.
8
Figure 1.2: Evolution of the Treasury Debt Portfolio 1920-2016
choreographed to the market ahead of time.9 Therefore it would reasonable to assume that
the bond market reacts to (expected) issuances as news shocks. By the same token, the
regression in its baseline setup is not a predictive regression unless market anticipations
of near-term Treasury issuances are perfect. For robustness, I move the issuance window
back and forward a few months, the results are not qualitatively changed.
The actual formula of supply is as follows.
MWIt =
∑
τ,t≤s≤t+12 FVOIss
τ
s · τ
NGDPt
(1.1)
=
∑
τ,t≤s≤t+12 FVOIss
τ
s · τ∑
τ,t≤s≤t+12 FVOIss
τ
s
·
∑
τ,t≤s≤t+12 FVOIss
τ
s
NGDPt
=WAMt · Total Issuancet
NGDPt
In the second equality, I decompose MWI into two terms: the weighted average ma-
turity of new issuances and the total issuance as a share of GDP. This decomposition
highlights the two different ways in which “supply” may be increased: 1) increasing the
weighted average maturity while keeping the quantity of supply to be absorbed constant;
2) increasing the quantity of supply while keeping the quantity supply the same. Since the
deficit to GDP ratio is known to be countercyclical, one way to resolve the endogeneity is-
9The Treasury Department holds quarterly meetings with the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee
(TBAC), consisting representatives from Primary Dealers in the Treasury market, to gauge demand and
solicit issuance recommendations.
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Figure 1.3: Plots of WAM of Issuance and 5 Year Term Premium
WAM (Issue) is the weighted average maturity of new issuances in the next two 12 months. ACMTP05 is the
zero coupon five year term premium from Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013).
sue is by instrumenting MWI measure using the WAM of issuance. Whereas the issuance to
GDP ratio reflects business cycle risks, WAM of issuance reflects mostly Treasury issuance
policy.
This instrument is valid if the US Treasury short term issuance policy is exogenous to
shocks to bond risk premia. I argue that this is indeed the case. Garbade (2007) explains
that the Treasury follows a “regular and predictable” auction schedule and does not engage
in “tactical issuance” or “market timing”. Hou (2018) documents that historically the
Treasury issuance has historically been driven by a desire of maintaining stability of its
outstanding portfolio rather than a myopic objective of borrowing at the cheapest maturity.
Indeed, Bhandari et al. (2017) shows in a theoretical model that the optimal Treasury
issuance policy is one that issues evenly across the maturities with a tilt towards the long
term debt when the debt to GDP ratio is high.
Bond Risk Premium
The bond risk premium, also called term premium, is the difference between long term
bond yield and the average of the expected future short term nominal interest rates. It
measures the degree to which the long term debt is more expensive than short term debt.
A variant of the BRP, which some papers use, is the next period expected excess return of
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a long term bond over one period riskless bonds. The regular bond term premium is equal
to the average of all future holding period excess returns.
yt (n) =
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
Etyt+i (1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sum of Expected Short Rates
+ xt (n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term Premium
(1.2)
xt (n) =
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
Et
[
p
(n−i−1)
t+i+1 − p(n−i)t+i − y(1)t+i
]
(1.3)
=
1
n
n−1∑
i=0
Et
[
rxn−i+1t+i
]
(1.4)
In the baseline I will focus on the regular measure of bond term premium, because it is a
direct measure for comparing the relative costs of borrowing across maturities. In addition,
it also happens to be the measure that policymakers care about. However, in the section
for robustness checks, I verify the results using expected excess returns version of the BRP
from Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and find that the results are very similar.
Since expectations of future short term interest rates are not observable, term premium
must be constructed from either statistical or survey-based measures of short rate expec-
tations. In the baseline, I use the term premiums derived by Adrian, Crump and Moench
(2013) (ACM) at the New York Fed. The authors estimate an exponentially affine term
structure model of interests on directly observed market coupon bond prices. It is a popu-
lar measure that is recognized by many policymakers and market participants as credible
and having good out of sample properties.10 Furthermore, in order to address the concern
that the my results are uniquely dependent on the BRP measure used, I verify the results
with three alternative measures for BRP: 1) the slope of the yield curve; 2) Cochrane-
Piazzesi excess returns measure; 3) Kim-Wright survey based measure; The slope of the
yield curve is a nonparametric measure that has been documented to predict excess returns
especially in the short run. The Cochrane-Piazzesi measure is the predicted excess returns
measure of the BRP. The Kim-Wright measure is special because it is estimated using both
the yield curves and survey data.
10A number of authors (Bernanke (2015)) agree that especially in the post financial crisis period, the
realized short term nominal rates, which have been low relative to long term rates from adjacent prior years,
confirm the high term premium predicted by the ACM model.
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Figure 1.4: Comparison of the ACM Term Premium With Alternatives
1.3 Empirical Results
1.3.1 Baseline Result
1.3.1.1 Supply Effect Increases in Stock-Bond Correlation
Figure 1.5: Plot of Bond Risk Premium vs. Supply by the Sign of the Stock-Bond Correlation
In this section, I present the main empirical result: the supply effect on BRP increases
with the stock-bond correlation. I regress the ten year term premium on the MWI measure
of supply. The results are presented in Table (1.1). The maturity choice of 10 year is
merely serving as a representative maturity. As will be shown below, both empirically
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and theoretically, the estimates on all the maturities are qualitatively similar and in fact
are amplified across maturities. The risk premium is in percents and the MWI measure
is in decimals and defined as above. The stock-bond correlation is calculated using DCC
(GARCH(1,1)) model, described in the previous section. The 1 Year Yield is the Treasury
1 year constant maturity bond yield. Finally, sign is a dummy variable that takes the value
of one when the stock-bond correlation is positive. Because it is an overlapping monthly
regression, there is induced serial correlation. Newey-West standard errors with 48 lags
are used.
The interpretation of the columns is as follows. Column (1) indicates that uncondition-
ally there is a positive relationship between supply and BRP. Recall that one unit increase
in MWI means that issuing a maturity weighted Treasury equal to the size of the nominal
GDP. A one unit increase in the maturity-weighted supply raised the required BRP by 1.8
percent. However, it is not statistically significant. In column (2) and (3), we control for
the stock-bond correlation. The positive relationship between BRP and supply (MWI coef-
ficient) becomes both stronger and statistically significant. A one unit increase in supply
raises the BRP by about 4 percent. There is a noticeable jump in R2 value from column (1)
to column (2) and (3). The MWI supply is not readily interpretable. A back of the enve-
lope estimation implies that the combined Treasury purchase of QE 1 and 2 ($900 billion),
would’ve lowered 10 year bond risk premium by about 60 basis points. This compares
with the estimates by Li and Wei (2013) and D’Amico and King (2013), who estimate the
impact as lowering 10 year yields by about 90 bps. The key variable of interest is the inter-
action term between supply and the stock-bond correlation. This corresponds to the term
”MWI x Corr” in column (3)-(5). The coefficient is positive and statistically significant,
which indicates that the supply effect increases with the stock-bond correlation. Column
(4) and (5) show that the effect is robust to the inclusion of the nominal one year interest
rate and the sign of the correlation. Controlling for the one year rate or the short rate,
because the BRP is known to be positively correlated with the level of the short rate. I also
control for the sign of the correlation because the correlation changed signs quite abruptly.
Controlling for the sign helps address the concern that the effect might be purely driven
by a regime switch in the late 90s.
An easier way to visualize and understand the empirical findings is by looking at Figure
1.5. Here I have divided the observations into two groups: the instances when the stock-
bond correlation is positive and the instances when it is negative. In each case, I plot the
10 year bond risk premium against the MWI supply measure. The two fitted lines with
distinctly different slopes may be interpreted as demand curves for Treasury bonds. When
the stock-bond correlation is positive, the demand curve is steep, suggesting that bond
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risk premium is very responsive to supply; when stock-bond correlation is negative, the
demand curve, is nearly flat, suggesting that the bond risk premium is very unresponsive
to supply changes. The latter case corresponds to studies since the 2008 financial crisis
that the removal of large quantities of long term debt from the market due to QE has only
led to a very modest reduction in the term premium.11
Table 1.1: Regression on MWI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES TP10 TP10 TP10 TP10 TP10
MWI 1.791 3.395*** 4.036*** 4.185*** 4.024***
(1.126) (0.922) (0.763) (0.709) (0.736)
Stock-Bond Corr 2.485*** -0.382 -1.211 0.156
(0.659) (1.351) (1.446) (1.597)
MWI x Corr 6.534*** 5.720** 6.203**
(2.509) (2.645) (2.510)
1Y Yield 0.143**
(0.058)
Sign -0.271
(0.508)
Constant 1.004*** 0.294 0.214 -0.551 0.364
(0.380) (0.434) (0.343) (0.503) (0.396)
Observations 665 665 665 665 665
Adjusted R-squared 0.07 0.41 0.48 0.55 0.48
Newey-West Standard Errors with 48 lags.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TP10 is the 10 year statistical term premium from Adrian, Crump and Moench
(2013); MWI is the maturity-weighted issuance to NGDP ratio; Stock-Bond Corr
is the dynamic conditional correlation of month returns of the S&P 500 index and
the 10 year Treasury bond index; 1Y Yield is the Treasury constant maturity 1 year
nominal yield; Sign is a dummy variable that equals to 1 when the stock-bond
correlation is positive.
One concern about the MWI as the measure of supply is that debt issuance or the deficit
is counter-cyclical. A latent business cycle factor could be driving both bond risk premium
and the amount of debt issuance. I regress BRP onto the weighted maturity of issuance
and issuance quantity separately. The Iss/GDP, which is the ratio of the total face value of
debt issuance to GDP, measures directly the quantity of debt issuance normalized by GDP.
By controlling explicitly for quantity, it partly address the endogeneity issue and partly
shows explicitly the “supply” effect due to maturity structure changes. In Table (1.2) both
the quantity and ”WAM x Corr” coefficients are positive and significant. WAM by itself
is positive but not significant. Supply does not drive out the “cross-partial” effects. It
11Hamilton and Wu (2012) estimates that retiring $ 400 billion of long term Treasuries would have only
reduced 10 year yield by 14 basis points.
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demonstrates that it is not simply that the quantity of debt that influences BRP but that
maturity structure itself actually matters. Further, the effect continues to be robust to the
inclusion of the short rate and the sign of the correlation.
Table 1.2: Regression on WAM and Issue/GDP Separately
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES TP10 TP10 TP10 TP10 TP10
WAM 0.330 0.282 0.313 0.188 0.299
(0.405) (0.272) (0.219) (0.184) (0.222)
Corr 2.583*** -1.695 -2.162 -1.004
(0.559) (1.531) (1.730) (1.822)
WAM x Corr 1.590*** 1.272** 1.492***
(0.512) (0.559) (0.510)
IssQuant 4.514 15.611*** 15.471*** 20.494*** 15.957***
(6.302) (4.330) (3.817) (3.669) (4.000)
1Y Yield 0.170***
(0.052)
Sign -0.289
(0.605)
Constant 0.211 -1.497** -1.429*** -2.752*** -1.315**
(0.646) (0.619) (0.499) (0.677) (0.523)
Observations 665 665 665 665 665
Adjusted R-squared 0.08 0.44 0.52 0.60 0.52
Newey-West Standard Errors with 48 lags.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TP10 is the 10 year statistical term premium from Adrian, Crump and Moench
(2013); WAM is the weighted average maturity of issuance over the following 12
months; Stock-Bond Corr is the dynamic conditional correlation of month returns
of the S&P 500 index and the 10 year Treasury bond index; 1Y Yield is the Treasury
constant maturity 1 year nominal yield; Sign is a dummy variable that equals to 1
when the stock-bond correlation is positive.
1.3.1.2 Instrumental Variable Test
To further address the concern that the supply measure may be endogenous, I use the
weight average maturity of issuance as an instrument. As discussed previously, the supply
measure may be endogenous because it is mechanically driven by the issuance (or roughly
deficit) to GDP ratio, which may be countercyclical. On the other hand, there is evidence
that the WAM of the issuance is relatively insensitive to the relative costs of borrowing
but has historically been driven primarily by the objective of the stabilizing the Treasury
portfolio. I discuss the evidence for the validity of the WAM of issuance as an instrument
in greater details in Section 2.
The results are presented in Table (1.3).The top panel shows the results from the first
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stage regression. R2 is close to 90%, which confirms that most of the variations in the
maturity-weighted supply measure comes from the maturity choice of issuance. The main
results are shown in the second panel. The results are broadly very similar. The coefficient
on the supply measure is again positive but only significant from column (2)- (4). However,
they are somewhat smaller compared to the baseline results. The more important variable
of interest is the interaction term ” ˆMWI×Corr is positive and significant and the magnitude
is also comparable to those in the baseline regression.
Table 1.3: Instrumental Variable Test
First Stage Regression: MWIt = α + β ·WAMisst + δy(1)t + ut
Instrument = WAMisst
WAMiss .210
(.0029)
1 Year Yield -.00955
(.00065)
R2 0.896
Second Stage Regression: TPt = α + β · ˆMWIt + γ · ˆMWI× Corr + δ′Xt + ut
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES tp10 tp10 tp10 tp10
ˆMWI 1.223 3.182*** 3.458*** 3.176***
(1.335) (0.903) (0.849) (0.888)
Corr -0.383 -1.426 -0.224
(1.458) (1.510) (1.830)
ˆMWI x Corr 6.114** 5.664** 6.001**
(2.788) (2.864) (2.892)
1Y Yield 0.151**
(0.070)**
Sign -0.076
(0.544)
Constant 1.207** 0.518 -0.324 0.561
(0.470) (0.390) (0.562) (0.418)
Observations 666 666 666 666
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.39 0.46 0.39
Newey-West Standard Errors with 48 lags.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.3.1.3 Summary
The message of this section is that the sensitivity of the bond risk premium to new Trea-
sury supply is systematically time-varying. In particular, the bond risk premium increases
more per unit of supply as the stock-bond correlation increases. In addition to the empir-
ical evidence provided above, I consider a host of robustness checks. I present the results
from these robustness checks after the model, which will produce some new predictions
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that will also be verified. The theoretical intuition given so far for the empirical results is
that in an asset market of limited arbitrage, arbitrageurs demand additional risk premium
for absorbing new supply of Treasury bonds. As bonds become better hedges for stocks
held by the arbitrageurs, the compensatory bond risk premium is reduced by the amount
of the hedging benefits of the bonds. In the following section, I use a modified version of
the preferred habitat model to more formally articulate the theoretical intuition.
1.4 Theoretical Framework
The model is adapted from the Greenwood and Vayanos (2014) model. There are two
types of agents. The first type is the preferred habitat (PH) borrowers or debt issuers, who
are price-inelastic and supply a continuum (of maturities) of Treasury bonds. I consider
the US Treasury Department (net of the Federal Reserve’s demands) as a PH borrower. This
assumption is valid if the Treasury’s issuance policy, in terms of how much it issues in any
particular maturity, is relative insensitive to the relative bond prices.12 The second type is
the arbitrageurs who integrate the bond markets by absorbing supply shocks in exchange
for risk premia. They are the net demanders of bonds in this model. Arbitrageurs can
invest in a continuum of nominal bonds and a single stock index. I do not allow multiple
stocks because the focus of the paper is on bonds and a single stock index is sufficient to
illustrate the intuition of the paper. Furthermore, it has been documented by Lines (2016)
that the portfolio of most large investment funds are benchmarked to the S&P500. Finally,
in line with Brennan and Xia (2002) I assume an exogenous stock price process with a
constant equity risk premium. In the appendix, I show that it is possible to allow a stock
price process with a time-varying equity premium, predicted by the short rate. Results are
amplified when such a generalization is made.
Because the model though simple has quite a few pieces, it may be useful to provide
a roadmap. First, I introduce the preferred habitat suppliers, who have exogenous price
inelastic supply functions. Second, I describe the economic problem of the representative
arbitrageur, who is the marginal investor in all bonds. Third, I describe the exogenous
short rate and stock price processes. I conjecture that the bond price has a standard ex-
ponentially affine form and derive expressions for bond returns. Fourth, I plug in the
expressions for bond returns and stock return into the arbitrageur’s budget constraint, ver-
12This assumption has been justified by the discussion in section 2. In Hou (2018), I provide evidence that
the maturity choice of the Treasury issuance is almost entirely explained by a desire to stabilize the maturity
structure of the total Treasury debt portfolio and the debt to GDP ratio. This finding is also consistent with
the Treasury’s own stated objective that it does not engage in tactical issuance or market timing (Garbade
(2007)).
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ify the bond price functional form and obtain as the arb’s first order conditions that the
bond risk premium is a linear function of the risk factors. Finally, I use asset market clear-
ing (arb demand equals PH supply) to generate equilibrium relationship between bond
risk premium and supply quantities with which I generate comparative statics predictions.
1.4.1 Preferred Habitat (Treasury) Supply Policy
Following Greenwood and Vayanos (2014), I assume that the Treasury supply of bonds
(net of Federal Reserve and other intergovernmental holdings) is driven by a single factor
model. The dollar value of the maturity τ bond supplied to the arbitrageurs is
s
(τ)
t = ζt (τ) + θ (τ) βt (1.5)
βt is a stochastic aggregate supply factor. βt may be thought of as new budget deficits
that must be financed. It follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, which is essentially the
continuous analogue of an AR(1) process.
dβt = −κββtdt+ σβdBβ,t (1.6)
ζ(τ) is the average supply of maturity τ . θ (τ) measures the sensitivity of the individual
bond supply to the aggregate supply shock.
1.4.2 Arbitrageurs Objective
The arbitrageurs invest in a stock index and a continuum (indexed by maturity) of
nominal bonds. We can think of the arbitrageurs as “banks” and other large financial insti-
tutions that participate actively in the bond market. It is well-known that a group known
as the “Primary Dealers”, who are typically the largest financial institutions, act essentially
as “wholesalers” in the Treasury primary (auction) markets.13 The arbitrageurs maximizes
the mean-variance of the expected instanenous increase in wealth or their portfolio. The
objective may be motivated by a value-at-risk internal regulatory constraint within a risk-
neutral institution. a is the risk-aversion parameter.
max{
x
(τ)
t
}
[
Et (dWt)− a
2
V art (dWt)
]
(1.7)
13In a new strand of literature ”intermediary asset pricing”, He, Kelly and Manela (2017) tests the theory
proposed by He and Krishnamurthy (2013). They show that a stochastic discount factor constructed based
on the equity capital ratio of the primary dealers has significant explanatory power for the cross-sectional
expected returns of a host of asset classes.
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The arbitrageurs are subject to the following budget constraint.
dWt =
∫ T
0
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(s)
t
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Stock Return
+
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(τ)
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P
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)
rtdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Riskfree Rate Return
(1.8)
where x(τ)t is the dollar investment in the bond of maturity τ and x
(s)
t is the dollar in-
vestment in the stock index. The arbitrageurs have a short horizon objective, where they
maximize the returns to wealth from period to period. The model may be thought of as
being the steady state of an overlapping generations model. Finally, I assume further that
the arbitrageurs’ holding of stocks as exogenous and fixed, x(s)t = x¯
(s)
t > 0. This assump-
tion can be interpreted as looking at the effect of supply on impact or in the very short
run, when the arbitrageurs are not able to quickly adjust allocations across asset classes.
Many institutional bond traders, say trading desks at investment banks or hedge funds,
are typically part of a business that is essentially exposed to the stock market risk (which
in turn proxies business cycle risk). They cannot easily shed substantial exposure to the
stock market risk without essentially exiting their business. The fixed stockholding as-
sumption is an extreme one. More generally, I should only need that the Arb investor faces
an downward-sloping demand curve for stocks so that it is slow to unload the stocks when
the return correlation turns adverse.
1.4.3 Equilibrium Bond Prices and Bond Returns
In addition to the Treasury supply policy, I assume two additional exogenous asset
return processes. First, the nominal short rate follows an exogenous Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process.
drt = κr (r¯ − rt) dt+ σrdBr,t. (1.9)
Secondly, the stock price follows a geometric Brownian motion.
dst =
dP st
P st
= (rt + σsξs) dt+ σsdBs,t. (1.10)
ξs represents a constant unit equity risk premium associated with the stock return innova-
tion dBs.
The bond prices and hence bond returns will be recursively determined in equilibrium
as solutions to stochastic differential equations. I solve the the model by a guess-and-verify
method. I conjecture that the price of a zero coupon bond of maturity τ is exponentially
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affine so that the bond yields 14 are linear in the risk factors rt and βt and st.
P
(τ)
t = exp [− (Ar (τ) rt + Aβ (τ) βt + As (τ) st + C (τ))] (1.11)
where Ar(τ), Aβ(τ), As(τ) measure the sensitivity of the bond price to the risk factors. The
Ai(τ)’s and C(τ) are solutions to the ordinary differential equations implied by the asset
market clearing conditions below. In the appendix, I verify the bond price by solving for
Ar(τ), Aβ(τ), As(τ) and C(τ) as deterministic functions of τ . In particular, it will be shown
that As (τ) = 0.
Now I can express the instantaneous bond return dP (τ)t /P
(τ)
t in terms of the underlying
shocks. By applying Iˆto’s lemma to (1.6)-(1.11), we obtain the following expression
dP
(τ)
t
P
(τ)
t
= µ
(τ)
t dt− Ar (τ)σrdBr,t − Aβ (τ)σβdBβ,t − As (τ)σsdBs,t (1.12)
where µτt , which denotes the expected instantaneous return, is defined as
µ
(τ)
t =A
′
r (τ) rt + A
′
β (τ) βt + A
′
s (τ) st + C
′
(τ)
− Ar (τ)κr (r¯ − rt) + Aβ (τ)κββt − As (τ) (r¯ + σSξt) (1.13)
+
1
2
Ar (τ)
2 σ2r +
1
2
Aβ (τ)
2 σ2β +
1
2
As (τ)
2 σ2s .
1.4.4 Arbitrageurs Demand
I solve for the arbitrageurs’ demand by plugging expressions for the bond returns (1.12)
and stock return (1.10) into the budget constraint (2.2) and in turn plugging the budget
constraint into the objective function. I further assume that Cov (βt, rt) = Cov (βt, st) = 0.
In other words, the covariance of the bond supply shock with the stock return and short
rate respectively are both zero. These assumptions are not essential but are useful for
deriving closed-form expressions of bond risk premia.
14Zero coupon bond price and bond yield are related in the following way. y(τ)t = − logP
(τ)
t
τ .
20
The objection can then be rewritten as follows.
max{
x
(τ)
t
}
([∫ T
0
x
(τ)
t
(
µ
(τ)
t − rt
)
dτ + x
(s)
t σSξS
])
dt (1.14)
−
∑
i=r,β,s
aσ2i
2
(∫ T
0
x
(τ)
t Ai (τ) dτ
)2
− aσ
2
s
2
(
x
(s)
t
)2
+ a
(∫ T
0
x
(τ)
t Ar (τ) dτ
)
x
(s)
t σrσsρr,s + a
(∫ T
0
x
(τ)
t Ar (τ) dτ
)
x
(s)
t σ
2
s
+ a
(∫ T
0
x
(τ)
t Ar (τ) dτ
)(∫ T
0
x
(τ)
t As (τ) dτ
)
σsσrρr,s + (Irrelevant Terms)
Maximizing the mean-variance objective w.r.t. this budget constraint, the arbitrageurs’
optimal nominal bond demands yield conditions in the form of instantaneous excess re-
turns.
µ
(τ)
t − rt =Ar (τ)λr,t + Aβ (τ)λβ,t + As (τ)λs,t
− Ar (τ)λr,tx(s)t
σ2s
σ2r
−
(
As (τ) + Ar (τ)
(
1 + x
(s)
t
))
λr,t
σs
σr
ρr,s (1.15)
where
λi,t = aσ
2
i
∫ T
0
xτtAi (τ) dτ, i ∈ {r, β, s} (1.16)
λi,t denotes the prices of risk.
1.4.5 Asset Market Clearing
In equilibrium, the stock and bond markets clear so that we have
x
(τ)
t = s
(τ)
t = ζ
(τ)
t + θ (τ) βt (1.17)
x
(s)
t = x¯
(s)
t
The second equality is the assumption that the arbitrageur’s stockholding is fixed upon
impact. The asset market equilibrium implies a set of ODEs that allows us to solve for
Ar(τ), Aβ(τ) and As(τ) as deterministic functions of τ . The details are relegated to the
appendix. In particular we find that As(τ) ≡ 0. In other words, bond prices are not
sensitive to the dynamics of stock returns except through the correlation between stock
returns and the short rate. This also significantly simplifies the expression for the bond
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risk premium.
µ
(τ)
t − rt = Ar (τ)λr,t + Aβ (τ)λβ,t − Ar (τ)λr,tx¯(s)t
σ2s
σ2r
− Ar (τ)
(
1 + x¯
(s)
t
)
λr,t
σs
σr
ρr,s (1.18)
where
λi,t = aσ
2
i
∫ T
0
(
ζ
(τ)
t + θ (τ) βt
)
Ai (τ) dτ
Correlation between Stock and Nominal Bond Returns
The stock and bond return correlation can now be calculated. Once again I make use
of the two simplifying assumptions σβr = σβs = 0. The first assumption says that the bond
supply shock and the level of the interest rate is uncorrelated. I show in the appendix that
similar to Greenwood and Vayanos (2014) relaxing this assumption, while significantly
complicating algebra, does not affect the results significantly. The second assumption says
that the bond supply shock and the stock returns are uncorrelated. It is a less innocent
assumption. There is reason to believe that over the business cycle, sharply adverse stock
return, say a financial crisis or the news of an impending recession, may predict future
deficits. However, at the frequency (less or equal to a year) which this paper looks at, it is
not unreasonable to think that deficits may respond less quickly than stock returns.
ρbs =Corr
(
dP
(τ)
t
P
(τ)
t
,
dP
(s)
t
P
(s)
t
)
(1.19)
=Corr (−Ar (τ)σrdBr,t − Aβ (τ)σβdBβ,t − As (τ)σsdBs,t, (rt + σSλS) dt+ σsdBs,t)
=Corr (−Ar (τ)σrdBr,t, σsdBs,t)
=− ρrs (1.20)
Because of these simplifying assumptions, stock-bond correlation becomes constant across
maturities.
22
1.4.6 Comparative Statics Predictions
Prediction 0
The supply effect is positive if ρr,s is sufficiently positive. I call this prediction 0 because
I do not explicitly test this prediction in the empirical section.
∂
(
µ
(τ)
t − rt
)
∂βt
=a
(
σ2r + σrσsρb,sx¯
(s)
t
)
Ar (τ)
∫ T
0
Ar (τ) θ (τ) dτ
+ aσ2βAβ (τ)
∫ T
0
Aβ (τ) θ (τ) dτ
Prediction 1
The supply effect increases with correlation.
∂2
(
µ
(τ)
t − rt
)
∂βt∂ρb,s
= aσrσsx¯
(s)
t Ar (τ)
∫ T
0
Ar (u) θ (u) du > 0
Intuition: In the presence of positive amount of stockholding, the absorption of additional
supply, which manifests in additional duration risk/interest rate risk, must be compensated
by higher bond risk premium. This effect is amplified when arbitrageur risk aversion is
heightened and when interest rate or stock return volatility is higher. This prediction
formally expresses what already been empirically tested.
Prediction 2
The model makes a second prediction. The degree to which the supply effect responds
to the correlation increases with maturity. This result has not yet been empirically tested
and it is what I will proceed to do.
∂
∂τ
∂2
(
µ
(τ)
t − rt
)
∂βt∂ρ
 = A′r (τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· aσrσsx¯(s)t
∫ T
0
Ar (u) θ (u) du︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0
1.4.7 Empirical Test of Prediction 2 of the Model
The model has a second and corollary prediction: the sensitivity of the supply effect
to the stock-bond correlation is amplified across the maturities. I test that prediction by
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regressing BRP of incremental maturities on the supply measure and the stock-bond cor-
relation. The results are presented in Table 1.4. The ”MWI x Corr” coefficients increase in
the term of the BRP from 5.5 at 2 year risk premium to about 9.8 at 10 years. The intuition
for the result is that long term bonds are more sensitive to short rate risk. Because of the
simple assumptions, the model almost mechanically generates a monotonic trend in the
supply effect if the interest rate (duration) risk is the sole risk affecting the term structure
of the BRP. The fact that the empirical evidence confirms this prediction also provides indi-
rect corroborating evidence for the assumption about the short rate risk being the primary
risk.
Table 1.4: Regress on ACM-BRP at Different Horizons
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ACMTP02 ACMTP03 ACMTP04 ACMTP05 ACMTP10
MWI 1.757*** 2.256*** 2.654*** 2.985*** 4.042***
(0.312) (0.398) (0.465) (0.517) (0.681)
Stock-Bond Corr -0.818 -1.000 -1.116 -1.199 -1.387
(0.548) (0.728) (0.869) (0.980) (1.292)
MWI x Corr 5.480*** 6.610*** 7.354*** 7.918*** 9.823***
(1.084) (1.425) (1.686) (1.884) (2.424)
Constant -0.042 -0.008 0.030 0.069 0.273
(0.140) (0.178) (0.210) (0.237) (0.323)
Observations 665 665 665 665 665
Adjusted R-squared 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.50
Newey-West HAC standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ACMTP‘n’ is the ACM n year term premium.; MWI is the maturity-weighted issuance
to NGDP ratio; Stock-Bond Corr is the dynamic conditional correlation of month
returns of the S&P 500 index and the 10 year Treasury bond index; 1Y Yield is the
Treasury constant maturity 1 year nominal yield.
1.5 Robustness Checks
1.5.1 Alternative Measures of Ex Ante BRP
This section addresses the concern that the results may be dependent on the particular
choice of ACM risk premium estimates. Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013) extract the
bond term premia from a purely statistical no-arbitrage bond pricing model. While it has
become popular with industry practitioners and central bank policymakers alike, there is
always the worry that these risk premium estimates could suffer from model misspecifi-
cation. I try to address this concern by looking at three alternative measures of the ex
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Figure 1.6: MWI Interaction Coefficients at Different Maturities
ante BRP: (1) the slope of the yield curve; (2) the Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) forward-
rates-based BRP (CP); (3) the Kim and Wright (2005) survey-based BRP (KW). Figure 1.7
shows the time series plot of all four BRP measures. The ACM, YC and the KW measures
of BRP follow each other pretty closely and CP measure is the most volatile. All these
measures assume that the bond yields are the sum of expected future short term yield and
BRP without forecast errors.15
1. Yield Curve Steepness
The yield curve steepness is the simplest and a popular proxy for ex ante BRP. The
shape of the yield curve reflects both the expectations of future short term interest
rates and the required term (or risk) premium. Fama and Bliss (1987) and Campbell
and Shiller (1991) show that in the near-term the yield curve predicts future excess
bond returns rather than future yield changes. However, in the long term, the yield
curve is a very poor predictor of BRP because of mean-reversion of short-rate expec-
tations. In table 1.5, we show the results from regressing the difference between
3 and 1 year yields on the same set of regressors. We see that that a very similar
pattern as the baseline regression with the ACM BRP. The ”MWI x Corr” coefficients
remain positive and statistically significant even though the statistical significance
drops somewhat. In table 1.6, we see that the second prediction of the model con-
tinues to hold. The coefficients increase across the maturities. The statistical signif-
15Cieslak (2016) shows that the bond investors exhibit extrapolative beliefs about interest rates, especially
around turns of business cycles. People overestimate interest rates as the economy enters a recession and
underestimates interest rates when it enters a boom. Allowing forecast errors is beyond the scope of this
paper.
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Figure 1.7: Different Measures of Ex-ante BRP
icance wanes as maturity increases. However, this could be consistent with the fact
that at longer horizons, YC becomes a much poorer and noisier predictor of the BRP.
2. Cochrane-Piazzesi BRP
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) uncovered a better predictor of future bond returns
than the yield curve. They regress realized bond returns on the five one-year forward
rates (the one to five years ahead marginal discount rates in the term structure) and
find that all bond returns seem to be predicted by a single forecasting factor. The
single forecasting factor consists of a ”tent-shaped” linear combination of forward
rates. The CP-BRP is more volatile than the other measures because it is derived
from realized excess returns. In table 1.7, we see that a very similar pattern as the
baseline regression emerges. The ”MWI” coefficients are bigger and become signifi-
cant when the stock-bond correlation is controlled for. The ”MWI x Corr” coefficients
are positive and statistically significant. Finally, the R2 jumps from merely to 2% to
20% when we control for stock-bond correlation. Once again, table 1.8 shows that
the supply sensitivity to correlation increases with maturity. For the CP-BRP, we only
go up to 5 years because the Fama-Bliss yields, which Cochrane-Piazzesi use, only go
up to 5 years.
3. Kim-Wright BRP (Survey-based Term Structure Estimates)
In contrast with the previous measures of BRP, Kim and Wright (2005) use direct sur-
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Table 1.5: Measure BRP with Yield Curve
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Slope3 Slope3 Slope3 Slope3 Slope3
MWI 1.016*** 1.052*** 1.312*** 1.190*** 1.313***
(0.325) (0.382) (0.338) (0.314) (0.346)
Stock-Bond Corr 0.063 -1.231 -0.737 -1.427
(0.315) (0.829) (0.579) (1.001)
MWI x Corr 3.206** 4.647*** 3.265*
(1.604) (1.237) (1.668)
1Y Yield -0.122***
(0.029)
Sign 0.111
(0.221)
Constant 0.058 0.042 0.010 0.674*** -0.052
(0.147) (0.169) (0.151) (0.206) (0.232)
Observations 665 665 665 665 665
Adjusted R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.42 0.18
Newey-West HAC standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Slope3 is the difference of 3 year and 1 year zero coupon yields; MWI is the
maturity-weighted issuance to NGDP ratio; Stock-Bond Corr is the dynamic condi-
tional correlation of month returns of the S&P 500 index and the 10 year Treasury
bond index; 1Y Yield is the Treasury constant maturity 1 year nominal yield.
vey data to purge the future short rate expectations components from bond yields and
hence obtain BRP. Using a Kalman filter framework, they incorporate the monthly 6
and 12 month ahead forecasts of Treasury bill yields from the Blue Chip Financial
Forecasts. This is supposed to produce more realistic looking yield curve history. The
shortcoming of the KW BRP is that it is a much shorter time series, only available
since about 1990, because the survey data did not begin until late 1980s. In table
1.9, we see that once again a very similar pattern emerges despite being a much
shorter sample. The second prediction of the model is also confirmed in table 1.10.
1.5.2 Inflation Uncertainty
It has been argued that an important source of bond risk premium comes from the in-
flation uncertainty premium. In particular, high inflation levels are associated with greater
inflation uncertainty. While it is know that the level of the nominal short rate is highly cor-
related with inflation, it is worthwhile to separately control for the inflation uncertainty.
Here we capture the uncertainty about long term expected inflation using the difference
between the long-term (10 year) government bond yields and the 5-year moving average
of real GDP growth rates. Table (1.11) shows that the main predictions of the model re-
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Table 1.6: Regress on YC-BRP at Different Horizons
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Slope2 Slope3 Slope4 Slope5 Slope10
MWI 0.701*** 1.312*** 1.839*** 2.289*** 3.750***
(0.197) (0.338) (0.438) (0.513) (0.720)
Stock-Bond Corr -0.740 -1.231 -1.597 -1.888 -2.794
(0.475) (0.829) (1.090) (1.289) (1.837)
MWI x Corr 2.168** 3.206** 3.743* 4.045* 4.514
(0.937) (1.604) (2.081) (2.435) (3.407)
Constant 0.020 0.010 -0.008 -0.025 -0.063
(0.086) (0.151) (0.201) (0.238) (0.342)
Observations 665 665 665 665 665
Adjusted R-squared 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.25 0.38
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Slope-n is the difference of n year and 1 year zero coupon yields; MWI is the
maturity-weighted issuance to NGDP ratio; Stock-Bond Corr is the dynamic condi-
tional correlation of month returns of the S&P 500 index and the 10 year Treasury
bond index; 1Y Yield is the Treasury constant maturity 1 year nominal yield.
mains robust after controlling for inflation uncertainty. Column 1 shows that the result
holds for the MWI measure of supply and column 2 shows that the result continues to hold
when we control for the quantity of issuance.
1.5.3 More Robustness Checks
There is a host of other robustness checks that are relegated to the appendix.
• Quarterly regressions and non-overlapping annual regressions: qualitatively very
similar but annual reg has less power.
• Different time sub-samples. In a way, the KW regressions are telling because the KW
series starts in 1990 Jan.
1.6 QE Unwind Application
The Fed is expected unwind about $180bil of Treasuries in 2018. Without calibrating
the model, we can only do a back of the envelope calculation of the expected effect of the
QE unwind taking stock-bond correlation into consideration. Assume that the Fed winds
proportionally so that its ”issuance” has the same maturity structure as its current holdings,
we can infer the duration risk from its current holdings. Roughly, an anticipated $180bil
unwinding corresponds to about 10bps an increase in 10 year term premium as opposed to
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Table 1.7: Measure BRP with Cochrane-Piazzesi Factor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES CP-BRP-3y CP-BRP-3y CP-BRP-3y CP-BRP-3y CP-BRP-3y
MWI 1.204 2.035* 2.905*** 2.506*** 2.905***
(1.105) (1.123) (0.843) (0.755) (0.817)
Stock-Bond Corr 1.464 -3.072* -2.115 -3.057
(0.988) (1.806) (1.456) (2.201)
MWI x Corr 11.240*** 14.468*** 11.238***
(3.625) (3.000) (3.535)
1Y Yield -0.260***
(0.051)
Sign -0.009
(0.621)
Constant 0.463 0.077 -0.017 1.486*** -0.012
(0.395) (0.494) (0.356) (0.485) (0.524)
Observations 612 612 612 612 612
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 0.08 0.20 0.34 0.20
Newey-West HAC standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
CP-BRP-3y is the estimated ex-ante 3 year BRP. It is generated by regressing the
realized excess returns of 3 year bonds on the Cochrane-Piazzesi factor, which is
a linear combination of forward rates; MWI is the maturity-weighted issuance to
NGDP ratio; Stock-Bond Corr is the dynamic conditional correlation of month re-
turns of the S&P 500 index and the 10 year Treasury bond index; 1Y Yield is the
Treasury constant maturity 1 year nominal yield.
about 25bps not considering the correlation effect. This is mostly a ”qualitative” estimate.
I’m working on a fully specified discrete VAR to obtain quantitatively meaningful estimates
and dynamic effects.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the Treasury bond issuances as a driver of the bond risk premium.
I provide empirical evidence for a new fact that the effect of Treasury supply on bond
risk premium strengthens when the stock-bond return correlation increases in maginitude.
This empirical finding is robust to a battery of robustness checks. I rationalize this empiri-
cal finding using a modified version of the preferred habitat term structure model. Treasury
as a borrower supplies bonds across the maturity spectrum with a certain inflexibility that
is driven by institutional policy. Risk averse arbitrageurs demand ex ante bond risk pre-
mium for absorbing new supply of Treasury bonds to compensate for both the duration
risk (interest rate risk) as well as the covariance risk with respect to the existing stocks
in their portfolio. The second risk factor appears because the arbitrageurs are unable to
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Table 1.8: Regress on CP-BRP at Different Horizons
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES CP-BRP-2y CP-BRP-3y CP-BRP-4y CP-BRP-5y
MWI 1.503*** 2.905*** 4.373*** 5.181***
(0.436) (0.843) (1.269) (1.503)
Stock-Bond Corr -1.590* -3.072* -4.624* -5.479*
(0.935) (1.806) (2.718) (3.221)
MWI x Corr 5.818*** 11.240*** 16.920*** 20.049***
(1.876) (3.625) (5.456) (6.465)
Constant 0.018 -0.017 -0.155 -0.291
(0.184) (0.356) (0.535) (0.634)
Observations 612 612 612 612
Adjusted R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Newey-West HAC standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
CP-BRP-‘n’y is the estimated ex-ante n year BRP; MWI is the maturity-weighted issuance to NGDP ratio;
Stock-Bond Corr is the dynamic conditional correlation of month returns of the S&P 500 index and the
10 year Treasury bond index; 1Y Yield is the Treasury constant maturity 1 year nominal yield.
Figure 1.8: QE Unwind Schedule
quickly shed their exposure to stocks or business cycle risks. As a result, they are un-
able to unload the additional covariance risks introduced by the new bonds and therefore
demand additional (possibly negative) bond risk premium. The effects identified in this
paper are new and economically meaningful. They have implications for understanding
the impact of shrinking Federal Reserve’s balance sheet as well as informing government
debt management policy.
The findings in this paper also prompt a couple promising directions of future research.
First, additional corroborating evidence may be found for the theory by looking directly at
financial arbitrageurs’ capital flows across asset classes. The model says that the high stock-
bond correlation plus slow asset allocation adjustment plus new Treasury lead to higher
bond risk premium. This implication may be tested by examining the portfolio dynam-
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Table 1.9: Kim-Wright Survey-based BRP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES KWTP5 KWTP5 KWTP5 KWTP5 KWTP5
MWI -1.805*** -0.950** 1.983** 2.096*** 1.531*
(0.674) (0.429) (0.934) (0.774) (0.795)
Stock-Bond Corr 2.498*** -2.430** -2.410** -2.569*
(0.418) (1.209) (1.087) (1.333)
MWI x Corr 11.450*** 10.212*** 10.329***
(2.976) (2.597) (2.542)
1Y Yield 0.083
(0.057)
sign 0.359
(0.499)
Constant 1.150*** 1.148*** 0.009 -0.390 -0.016
(0.281) (0.185) (0.357) (0.391) (0.411)
Observations 316 316 316 316 316
Adjusted R-squared 0.15 0.65 0.75 0.76 0.76
Newey-West HAC standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
KWTP5 is the Kim-Wright 5 year term premium. It is estimated by incorporating sur-
vey data into a three factor term structure model; The MWI is the maturity-weighted
issuance to NGDP ratio; Stock-Bond Corr is the dynamic conditional correlation of
month returns of the S&P 500 index and the 10 year Treasury bond index; 1Y Yield
is the Treasury constant maturity 1 year nominal yield.
ics of the key bond-trading institutions, e.g., mutual funds, pension funds and insurance
companies. Secondly, we may write down a discretized version of the model following
Hamilton and Wu (2012) and incorporate the stock-bond correlation as a state variable to
generate quantitatively meaningful estimates for the supply effects of the QE unwinding
among other policies.
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Table 1.10: Regress on KW-BRP at Different Horizons
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES KWTP2 KWTP3 KWTP4 KWTP5 KWTP10
MWI 1.024*** 1.351* 1.679* 1.983** 2.861***
(0.313) (0.777) (0.887) (0.934) (0.982)
Stock-Bond Corr -1.344*** -1.737* -2.103* -2.430** -3.326**
(0.405) (0.997) (1.145) (1.209) (1.383)
MWI x Corr 7.548*** 9.239*** 10.494*** 11.450*** 13.441***
(0.969) (2.426) (2.810) (2.976) (3.298)
Constant 0.101 0.059 0.024 0.009 0.177
(0.124) (0.307) (0.344) (0.357) (0.369)
Observations 316 316 316 316 316
Adjusted R-squared 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.75 0.67
Newey-West HAC standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
KWTP‘n’ is the Kim-Wright n year term premium.; MWI is the maturity-weighted
issuance to NGDP ratio; Stock-Bond Corr is the dynamic conditional correlation of
month returns of the S&P 500 index and the 10 year Treasury bond index; 1Y Yield
is the Treasury constant maturity 1 year nominal yield.
Figure 1.9: Federal Reserve Portfolio on Sep-13 2017
32
Table 1.11: Regression on MWI: Inflation Uncertainty
(1) (2)
VARIABLES tp10 tp10
WAM 0.359*
(0.186)
Corr -1.529* -2.647*
(0.836) (1.567)
WAM x Corr 1.749***
(0.525)
IssQuant 16.359***
(3.656)
Infl Uncertainty 0.123*** 0.116***
(0.030) (0.044)
MWI 4.504***
(0.477)
MWI x Corr 7.838***
(1.654)
Constant -0.356 -2.069***
(0.223) (0.577)
Observations 658 658
Adjusted R-squared 0.54 0.57
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TP10 is the 10 year statistical term premium from Adrian, Crump and
Moench (2013); MWI is the maturity-weighted issuance to NGDP ra-
tio; Stock-Bond Corr is the dynamic conditional correlation of month
returns of the S&P 500 index and the 10 year Treasury bond index;
1Y Yield is the Treasury constant maturity 1 year nominal yield.
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CHAPTER II
A Realistic Model of U.S. Treasury Debt Management
Abstract
The operation of the U.S. Treasury debt management is understudied and not well un-
derstood theoretically. I document new empirical stylized facts about the postwar U.S.
Treasury debt management policy. In particular, I document the puzzling fact that the US
Treasury has tended to historically issue more long-term debt when the term spread is
greatest. I propose a simple model that captures the practical incentives and constraints
faced by the Treasury debt manager. The debt manager seeks to minimize borrowing costs
while managing rollover risks. I calibrate the model to generate a measure of time-varying
roll-over risks faced by the U.S. Treasury.
JEL Codes:
Keywords: U.S. Treasury, debt management, safe asset, roll-over risk
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2.1 Introduction
In this paper, I study how the U.S. Treasury has historically managed its debt obli-
gations and issued new debts. This is an important but also understudied question. Its
importance comes from both the sheer size of the U.S. federal government debt and the
unique and pervasively important role U.S. Treasury securities play in the global financial
markets. To date, the economics literature has mostly either dismissed the government
debt management policy as an unimportant subject under some version of the Ricardian
neutrality argument or focused on the question of optimal debt maturity structure. As a
result, few academic studies have engaged seriously the actual way in which the U.S. gov-
ernment debt is historically managed and the practical incentives and constraints faced by
the Treasury debt managers. Against this background, this paper makes two contribution
to the subject of government debt policy. First, I document a few new systematic patterns
that characterize the U.S. Treasury debt issuances since the end of World War 2. Second, I
propose a simple theoretical model that captures the essential trade-offs faced by the debt
manager and rationalizes some salient facts observed in the data.
I begin by presenting four stylized facts that characterize the empirical patterns of
the U.S. Treasury issuance policy since 1950.1 The first fact says that about 50% of the
Treasury’s issuance decisions involve choosing how much to borrowing in short-maturity
(less than 1 year in time to maturity) versus in the rest of the maturities. Furthermore, the
amount borrowed in the longer maturities is typically spread out evenly across the maturity
spectrum. The other 50% of the decisions are about adjusting issuances between adjacent
maturity buckets further down the maturity spectrum. This latter set of decisions is likely
driven by the goal of having some recently issued securities in every maturity bucket.2 The
second fact says that when the Treasury decides to lengthen the maturity of its issuance,
it does so by spreading the new gross issuances across the maturity spectrum rather than
concentrating on a single point of maturity. I show that the weighted average maturity of
quarterly issuance is strongly positively correlated with measures of the issued securities’s
maturity dispersion. The second fact reinforces a message in the first fact that the Treasury
appears to have a strong desire to spread the issuance of large amount of longer-term
1I focus on the Treasury’s gross quarterly issuances and not the stock of Treasury debt outstanding. The
reason is that the debt stock is a cumulative reflection of the past issuance decisions, whereas the gross
issuances reflect the decisions made by the Treasury in response to current incentives and constraints.
2There is well-documented evidence that newly issued Treasury securities are traded at a higher market
price than older Treasury securities with similar time-till-maturity. This phenomenon is known as the “on/off-
the-run liquidity premium”.(Krishnamurthy (2002)) Having recently issued benchmark Treasury securities
promotes liquidity and higher secondary market prices of Treasuries and in turn benefit primary market
operations.
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debt across many different maturity points. The first two empirical facts suggest that the
Treasury historically has been highly conscious about the impact of its issuance’s maturity
allocation. This is also consistent with the U.S. Treasury’s own emphasis of the liquidity or
price impact of its supply actions.3 This runs somewhat contrary to the common impression
that the market for U.S. Treasury securities is the world’s most largest and most liquid
financial market.
The third and fourth stylized facts deal with the fundamental drivers of issuance and
the cyclicality of the issuance maturity. Fundamentally, there are two sources of federal
government borrowing needs at any given time. Either there is old government debt ma-
turing that must be refinanced or there are fresh federal deficits.4 The third fact says that
the weighted average maturity of issuance lengthens in response to both sources of fund-
ing needs. Moreover, I show that (long-term) debt maturing has only a temporary impact
on the issuance maturity while a rise in deficit has a much more persistent effect on the
issuance maturity. The fourth empirical fact points out a positive correlation between the
issuance maturity and the term spread, which reflects the relative expensiveness of long-
term debt over short-term debt. Since 1950, the periods of high deficit-to-GDP ratio have
consistently coincided with the local peaks of the spread between long-term and short-term
interest rates. And since deficits lead to a persistent lengthening of the weighted average
maturity of issuance, this means that larger issuances of long-term debt have tended to
happen when long-term interest rates are high relative to short-term interest rates. I fur-
ther confirm that this correlation exists between the issuance maturity and a purer measure
of the term premium of long-term Treasury debt.5 This last empirical regularity is particu-
larly puzzling if one believes that the Treasury’s operation, similar to an ordinary borrower,
is guided by the objective of minimizing borrowing costs.6
3The Treasury’s public documents and the reports and minutes of the primary dealers have historically
repeatedly emphasized the importance of “not exceeding market demand” for securities of particular matu-
rities. See Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee (1982-2017b) and Treasury Borrowing Advisory Com-
mittee (1982-2017a).
4After World War 2, recognizing that the a maturing Treasury security was more likely to be refinanced
than extinguished, Treasury officials gradually began to think in terms of regular schedule of debt issuances
and later predictable debt maturities and quantities. (Garbade (2007))
5The simple difference between long-term and short-term interest rates does not necessarily reflect the
relative expensiveness of borrowing long-term. Because long-term interest rates contain both expectations
about future short-term interest rates and the risk premium over the uncertainty about future short rates, a
purer measure of the relative expensiveness strips out the expectational component of the term spread. In
this paper, I will use a popular measure first proposed by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005).
6The Treasury’s own website and internal historical documents state that its top objective, both presently
and historically, is to minimize the cost of borrowing over time. Of course, the U.S. Treasury is no ordinary
borrower and it might interpret the concept of “cost” more broadly than interest costs and to include welfare
costs. Yet, peppered throughout Treasury’s documents and its advisory council (TBAC)’s minutes are refer-
ences to “interest costs”. Of course, the Treasury also lists other objectives such as liquidity and roll-over
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To help understand these empirical facts (in particular the last two), I propose a simple
positivist model of the Treasury debt management. This contrasts with existing models in
the small public debt maturity structure literature that are almost all normative. Starting
with Lucas. and Stokey (1983), the optimal debt management literature emphasizes the
fiscal insurance property of public debt and the minimization of tax distortions. The idea is
to structure the public debt a such a way that the variations in its market value can shield
the government against the need to raise taxes during bad fiscal times.(e.g., Angeletos
(2002)) Such models turn out to be highly impractical. Because of the high correlation of
returns between bonds of different maturities, to achieve any meaningful fiscal insurance,
the U.S. government would need to take unrealistically large long-short positions in Trea-
sury bonds and private debt.7 This has clearly not been the historical practice of the U.S.
Treasury, which has been averse and constrained from issuing publicly-held government
debt even close to parity with GDP. And before the financial crisis, the U.S. Treasury has
never held any meaningfully large quantities of privately-issued debt securities. The fact
that government’s actual practice strays from the predictions of the normative models has
usually been viewed as the government not operating “optimally”.
In this model, I emphasize the practical incentives and realistic constraints faced by the
Treasury officials that may have led to the observed issuance decisions. In a two-period
model, the Treasury seeks to minimize the cost of borrowing and the disutility of roll-
over risk. It is taken as exogenous that short-term debt is cheaper than long-term debt.8
Therefore, the Treasury can conserve borrowing costs by issuing more short-term debt.
However, borrowing short-term comes with its own “cost” that is the roll-over risk: short-
term debt mechanically must be rolled over more frequently. An over-reliance on short-
term debt means that the government must return to the bond market frequently, which
carries the risk that one of these times there are not sufficient number of investors whose
aggregate demand can roll over the maturing debt. And this risk is costlier as the quantity
of debt (to be issued) rises in its size as a share of the economy. I capture the roll-over
risk in the model as a quadratic deviation of short-term share in the issuance from a target
share. Another feature of the model is that short term interest rate, and to a less extent
risk, which shall form part of the theoretical investigation in this paper.
7Buera and Nicolini (2004) and Faraglia, Marcet and Scott (2010) show using a calibrated model that
the government would need to buy and hold (long) private bonds and sell (short) government bonds that
are at least 5 or 6 times of the GDP to meaningfully insure the U.S. against the types of fiscal shocks it has
experienced historically. And since even debt stock approaching 100% of GDP already causes alarm, such
prescriptions are wildly unrealistic.
8This is an empirical regularity that short-term interest rates are usually lower than long-term interest
rates. Even though the yield curve has occasionally “inverted”, the term structure of interest rates has
historically been almost always positively sloped.
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long-term interest rate, decreases in response to an adverse aggregate shock that raises the
deficit to GDP ratio. This is an empirical regularity, but may be thought of as coming from
either central bank intervention or “flight to safety” demand. Finally, I assume that the
market has a limited capacity to absorb long-term debt elastically. When the government
issues too much long-term debt beyond a certain threshold, it faces a downward-sloping
demand curve that further supply depresses the price of long-term bond and raises bond
yield.
The model provides us with a useful framework to understand the postwar Treasury’s
issuance policies. Specifically, there are three elements that the Treasury cares about: bor-
rowing costs, roll-over risk and market liquidity in terms of price impact. My model shows
how these three objectives naturally come together as practical incentives for Treasury offi-
cials as they weigh the trade-off of debt maturities. Besides making a number of reasonable
comparative statics predictions, I show in the model why the Treasury would willingly is-
sue long-term debt exactly when long-term debt is more expensive. As the deficit to GDP
ratio rises sharply, short-term bond yield falls while long-term bond yield falls by less. As a
result, the interest savings from issuing short-term debt is now greater. At the same time,
the rising deficit to GDP ratio raises the borrowing need and hence the roll-over risk per
unit of short-term debt issued. In the equilibrium in which the inelastic demand threshold
for long-term debt has not been hit, the Treasury lengthens average maturity in response
to the deficit/GDP shock if the marginal interest rate savings from shortening is less than
the marginal disutility of roll-over risk. The model allows us to quantify the amount of the
actual risk faced by the Treasury, which in turn allows us to assess whether the Treasury’s
issuance policy during bad times is a reflection of risk or its risk aversion.
2.2 Relation to Literature
This paper sits at the intersection of three main strands of literature. The first strand
is a small but resurgent literature on the (mostly theory) of Treasury debt management.9
Starting with Barro (1979) and Lucas. and Stokey (1983), and extended by papers such
as Bohn (1990) Angeletos (2002) and Nosbusch (2008), fiscal insurance theory of optimal
debt management argues that the government debt should be managed with the objective
of smoothing tax burdens across time. Buera and Nicolini (2004) and Faraglia, Marcet and
Scott (2010) show that debt management models based on tax-smoothing argument alone
9There is a related literature that investigates the determinants and sustainability of the U.S. debt to GDP
ratio. Because it is about the aggregate amount of debt and not directly about the maturity structure of debt,
I will not describe in details but want just mention. Notable papers include Bohn (1998) and more recently
Hall and Sargent (2011).
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tend to produce wildly unrealistic prescriptions.10 Most recently, Bhandari et al. (2017)
show that it is not possible for the government to fully hedge its fiscal shocks given the
high correlations of bond returns. If the government only aims for partial fiscal insurance,
the optimal maturity structure should a balanced amount of long-only government debt,
slightly tilting towards long maturities. Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2015) propose
a simple model of debt management where the government trades off between roll-risk
and the the liquidity premium of short-term debt. Their model is related to the model in
this paper. However, they interpret roll-over risk in terms of distortionary tax burdens.
Moreover, in their paper short-term Treasury debt is cheaper because it is more liquid
than the private debt of a similar maturity. They emphasize the liquidity premium of
Treasury bills to advocate that the government should optimally issue more short-term debt
to “chase out” private short-term debt. In this paper, I seek to understand the government’s
actions.
The second strand of literature is related to the corporate debt maturity structure in
the corporate finance. Diamond (1991) and Diamond and He (2014) propose that firms
choose its optimal debt maturity by trading off the signaling or displining value of short-
term debt against the associated roll-over risk in the sense of inefficient early liquidation.
This paper presents a contrast with that literature by showing the government’s incentives.
Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2010) suggest that taking government’s issuance policies
as given, firms tend to time its debt issuance’s maturity by filling in the “gaps” in the
maturity spectrum, which are not populated by Treasury securities. This paper presents a
theory on why and how the government may go about timing its own issuances’ maturity.
The last strand of literature is on the supply of “safe assets”. The U.S. Treasury securities
are widely considered a safe asset in the sense that it serves as a storage of value in the
worst contingent state of the world. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) and Caballero
and Farhi (2017) suggest that there is a general shortage of safe assets in the world, which
can lead to financial and macroeconomic fragility. He, Krishnamurthy and Milbradt (2018)
presume a general shortage of safe assets and propose a mechanism that endogenously
determines the safety status of the U.S. Treasury securities. Their paper shares a similar
understanding for the fundamental cause of the roll-over risk: the self-fulfilling lack of
common action by investors to roll over the debt. In this paper I detail a simple framework
of how the U.S. Treasury chooses the supply of safe assets. To the extent that short-term
Treasuries are considered safer than long-term Treasuries, by lengthening maturity during
bad fiscal times the U.S. Treasury has effectively reduced supply of safe asset exactly during
10As mentioned in the introduction, meaningful fiscal insurance typically requires the government holding
long-short positions of private and public debt to the order of multiples of the U.S. GDP.
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periods when they are most needed.
2.3 Data
In this paper, I use two types of data: 1) the historical data on the prices and quantities
of outstanding Treasury securities; 2) other fundamental financial and macroeconomic
time series data. I will describe the Treasury data first. The data on the historical Treasury
security portfolio mainly comes from the CRSP Treasury database from 1955 to 2017. The
CRSP Treasury database contains snapshots of all Treasury securities outstanding at the
end of each month. Each observation contains the end of month second market price of the
security, quantity outstanding as well as other issue characteristics such as issuance date,
maturity date, call date, coupon rate, bond type etc.11 The CRSP Treasury database obtains
the quantity and issue information from the Monthly Statement of Public Debt (MSPD),
which is publicly available form the U.S. Treasury website. (Treasury (2018)) The bond
prices in the CRSP database come from either GovPX or the New York Fed as detailed in
CRSP (2014) document. The CRSP database contains, especially between 1955 and 1960,
numerous instances of errors, missing entries and other mistakes. I manually verify the
CRSP datasets against the MSPD records and manually correct any mistakes or missing
entries. Furthermore, I extend the CRSP Treasury database backward to 1919 by manually
inputting the quantity outstanding and other issue information of marketable Treasury
securities from the MSPD.12 Old bond prices prior to the start of the CRSP database or
missing from the it are obtained from the archival records of the Wall Street Journal.
From the extended Treasury database, I can create a complete history of the Treasury
gross issuances. I collapse the monthly Treasury database into a quarterly dataset when
I create the issuance dataset. This is because the U.S. Treasury makes issuance decisions
quarterly at the so-called “quarterly refunding”. It turns out that new Treasury issuances
can take two main forms: new securities and “reopenings”. Because the Treasury database
tracks each security from the month of its birth to the month of its extinguishment, I am
able to see the evolution of the changes in the quantity outstanding over its lifetime. The
new issuances are easily identified whenever a new security shows up for the first time in
the database. Reopenings are less straightforward. In a security reopening, the Treasury
issues additional amounts of a previously issued, typically long maturity, security. The
reopening has the same maturity date and coupon rate as that of the original security.
11See CRSP (2014), the data documentation, for details on the CRSP Treasury database.
12When I started the project, this was the first and most complete dataset on the historical U.S. Treasury
debt portfolios. However, since then Hall and Sargent (2015) and Hall, Payne and Sargent (2018) have
created a longer dataset on the historical Treasury debt going back to 1776.
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Securities are sometimes reopened either because the Treasury wants to lengthen matu-
rity using some recently issued ultra-long-maturity securities and sometimes to support
the market liquidity of these securities.13 Either way, reopenings reflect the Treasury’s is-
suance decisions and should be properly identified. Because reopenings are not separately
reported in the database, I develop proxy identifier for reopenings based on the changes
in the quantity outstanding of a given security. Details are explained in the appendix.
In addition to the data on Treasury debt, I also use some fundamental financial and
macroeconomic time series data. The interest rate-related data can all obtained from
the Federal Reserve Board website. Specifically, I use zero coupon bond yields that are
estimated by Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright (2006). This data series is maintained and
updated daily on the Federal Reserve board website. The term spread is calculated from
these zero coupon yields. In addition, the Cochrane-Piazzesi term premium measure is
taken from Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and extended by the author. Cochrane and
Piazzesi use the Fama-Bliss bond yields that are available from the CRSP Treasury data
base. The rest of the macro time series data comes from either Global Financial Data
(GFD) or the FRED database at the St. Louis Fed.
2.4 Empirical Stylized Facts
In this section I will present a few empirical facts about the U.S. Treasury debt issuance
policy since the end of World War 2. These stylized facts summarize salient and consistent
features of the Treasury debt management even as the policy and the debt instruments
have evolved over this time period. Before discussing these facts, I will provide a brief
general description about the evolution of the Treasury securities market over the last 100
years and explain why I restrict the focus of this study to time period after World War 2.
I restrict the focus on the postwar time period because the the Treasury debt market
operated under drastically different institutional conditions.14 Prior World War 2, the U.S.
federal government mostly relied on one off, sometimes fixed price, sale of very long-term
13The reason that the Treasury may reopen a 30 year bond 2 years later rather than issuing a 28 year bond
is because gradually the Treasury recognized the value of having “benchmark” securities at standardized ma-
turities. Benchmark securities are somewhat akin having fewer but iconic products for a consumer product
brand. The Treasury and its market advisors believe that eliminating a myriad of maturities can boost market
liquidity. Currently the benchmark maturities include 2, 7, 10, 20, 30 year bonds.
14See Garbade (2012) for an excellent and comprehensive account of the U.S. Treasury debt market prior
to the end of WWII. In the 1920s, the U.S. Treasury used a combination of auction of Treasury bills and
fixed price sale of long-term bonds. The auction mechanism was suspended in the 1930s through the end of
WW2. Leading up to and during WW2, the Treasury issued several heavily discounted fixed price long-term
bonds to help finance the war. Generally speaking, the market for Treasury was significantly less developed
and less liquid before the World War 2.
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Figure 2.1: The Evolution of the Treasury Debt Stock and New Issuances
The top figure depicts the evolution of the maturity structure of the U.S. Treasury debt from 1920 Jan to 2017 Dec. The securities
are organized into time-till-maturity buckets. Each color represents the total face value of the Treasury securities in a maturity bucket
as a percentage of the total debt outstanding in that month. The data before 1960 is faded out because the market structure was
significantly different and hence not the focus of this study. The bottom figure depicts the evolution of the maturity structure of
Treasury new issuances. Each color represents the total face value share of the securities in a maturity bin issued within the quarter.
The maturity shares are smoothed over the past 4 quarters for a clearer depiction. The empirical analysis of the issuance data does not
smooth the data.
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bonds to finance its deficits. In fact, until 1939, Congress had to authorize the sale of
individual Treasury securities rather than specifying a limit on the aggregate amount of
public debt outstanding.15 This is the reason that in the top figure in Figure (2.1), we
see much a much larger and much more volatile shares of the debt outstanding coming
from long maturity debt. The volatility of maturity shares (shown up as sharp spikes
in the maturity shares) comes from single long-term securities maturing. For the same
reason, the weighted average maturity of the debt outstanding (dark line in the top figure
in Figure (2.1)) started high early in the century and gradually trended down until the
1950s. Since the early 1950s, the maturity structure of the debt outstanding has become
much more stable as seen in the the much smoother evolution of the different maturity
shares in the top figure in Figure (2.1). The weight average maturity has also taken up a
more statistically stationary profile, averaging just under 5 years.
The focus of this paper is on the maturity structure of the issuances since the 1950s.
In the bottom figure in Figure (2.1) I depict the face value shares of different maturity
buckets of new Treasury securities issued in each quarter. Note that compared to the
top figure Figure (2.1), only new securities issued within the quarter are plotted here.16
Similar to the evolution of the debt stock in the top figure of Figure (2.1), we see a similar
moderation of the maturity share volatility since the end of World War 2. However, the
maturity shares of new issuances are still significantly more volatile than the debt stock.
This is a mechanical feature because we are looking at a “flow” variable instead of a stock
variable. Another notable mechanical feature of the bottom figure of Figure (2.1) is that
we significantly greater shares of short-term issuances. This is because short-term debt by
construction is maturing and reissued much more frequently. In any given quarter, we will
unsurprisingly see a larger share of the short-term (gross) issuances. At the same time,
the significance of the longer-term issuances is understated in the plot. Because long-term
issuance remains outstanding for along time, a small share of the long-term issuance in
fact represents a weightier policy choice. Therefore while the dynamic evolution in the
bottom figure of Figure (2.1) is the subject of this study, we need to employ other tools to
better visualize of how the issuance maturity structure has evolved.
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Figure 2.2: Principal Components of Quarterly Issuance Shares
PCA is applied on the maturity shares of the quarterly new issuances. The first four principal components (PCs) sum up to 100% of the
variability. Their loadings are plotted above.
Fact 1: Treasury’s Issuance Decisions Consist Of Two Types of Strategies
In the first stylized fact I decompose the Treasury’s issuance decisions into interpretable
strategy types. Given an exogenous amount of aggregate borrowing need, an issuance de-
cision in each quarter consists of assigning a set of numbers to the different points on the
maturity spectrum that add up to one.17 To make the analysis feasible, I discretize the ma-
turity spectrum by lumping it into five maturity categories (as in Figure 2.1): less than 1
year, 1 to 5 years, 5 to 10 years, 10 to 15 years, 15 years or more.18 For each maturity cate-
gory, I calculate the total face value of new issues in the category as a share of the total face
value of debt issued in that quarter.19 Therefore the history of the Treasury’s quarterly is-
suance decisions since 1950 is now encoded into a sequence of five-vectors. I apply a prin-
cipal component analysis to these maturity shares to further reduce the high-dimensional
sequence into orthogonal and more interpretable components or strategy types. The result
of the principal component analysis is presented in Figure (2.2).
15See Hall and Sargent (2015) for a detailed discussion of the history of the U.S. debt limit and its wider
economic implications.
16The issuance shares have been smoothed over the past four quarters for a clearer rendering. The empir-
ical analysis does not use the smoothing. The plot of the unsmoothed issuance shares is in appendix.
17In principle, the Treasury could issue debt of any fractional years in maturity, thereby making the problem
an infinite dimensional one. In practice, the Treasury only has only issued maturities in whole number of
months for short-term debt and whole number of years for long-term debt.
18Because these are all new issues, there is minimal difference between maturity at birth and time till
maturity. I measure maturity with maturity at birth for every security within the same quarter.
19The difference with what is depicted in Figure 2.1 is that these maturity shares are not smoothed.
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The principal component analysis reveals that the Treasury issuance decisions can
roughly be condensed into two types of strategies. The first principal component (PC)
in Figure (2.2), which looks like a hockey stick, explains about 49% of the variations in
the issuance decisions. It is negative in the first maturity bin and positive and approximate
flat across the other maturity bins.20 This is saying that about 50% of the time, the Treasury
is deciding between how much to issue in short maturity (maturity < 1 year) like Treasury
bills versus those of longer maturities, like Treasury Notes and Bonds. Furthermore of the
amount issued not issued in short-maturity, it tend to be spread relatively evenly across
the maturity bins. I present drawings of some highly stylized issuance strategies in Figure
(2.3) to further illustrate this idea. Let the top figure of Figure (2.3) represent the issuance
choice of issuing 20% in each maturity bin. Then the middle figure in Figure (2.3) repre-
sents the first PC or the strategy of issuing 10% less of maturity bin 1 and 2.5% more in
maturity bin 2 through 5.21 I call this issuance strategy “bracketing” in the sense of the
Treasury bracketing how much to issue in short-maturity and spreading the rest evenly on
the longer-maturities.
The second through the fourth PCs have a common shape which “tilts” or “wiggles”
between two adjacent maturity bins. I call such issuance strategies a tilting strategy. Take
the third PC as an example. PC3 is negative in the [5,10] bin, positive in the [10,15]
bin and close to zero otherwise. Using the top and bottom subfigures in Figures (2.3) as
illustration, this is roughly equivalent to reducing the [5,10] bin’s issuance share by 10%
and raising [10,15] bin by 10%. The story is similar for PC2 and PC4. This “wiggling”
of issuance shares between adjacent maturity bins is likely driven by a desire to promote
market liquidity of Treasury securities. There is widely documented evidence that recently
issued (also known as “on-the run”) long-term Treasuries enjoy a liquidity premium over
older Treasury securities with similar time-til-maturities(Krishnamurthy (2002)). As a re-
sult, the Treasury officials have regularly expressed the desire to ensure the availability
of recently-issued Treasury securities across the maturity spectrum. Therefore, if a 7-year
bond or 10-year bond can both fulfill the purpose of lengthening maturity, a 7-year bond
may be issued if there has not been any issuance of 7 year bonds in a while.
20Some argument will necessarily be of a different sign from the others because the maturity shares have
to add up to 1. For one argument to go up, some other argument(s) must go down.
21Note that since the PCA loadings are eigenvectors and bases of the issuance strategy space in linear
algebra language. The issuance strategies represented by these PCs are equivalent up to scaling including
a change of sign. Therefore, PC1 can also easily be interpreted as raising the share of the [0,1) bin and
lowering the shares of longer-term debt bins. Similarly for PC2-4.
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Figure 2.3: Issuance Choices Can Be Decomposed Into Two Strategy Types
These figures illustrates how the PCA results in Figure (2.2) can be interpreted in terms of issuance strategies. The top figure sets up a
baseline issuance pattern of 20% in each maturity bin. The middle figure represents the first principal component, which is to reduce
the share of the first maturity and evenly raise the shares of the longer maturity bins and vice versa. The bottom figure represents the
third principal component, where the Treasury is tilting the issuance between the [5,10] and [10,15] maturity bins.
46
Fact 2: Treasury lengthens maturity by spreading new issuances across the maturity
spectrum.
Figure 2.4: Demonstration Of Alternative Ways Of Lengthening Maturity
These two figures depict the two alternative ways in which the Treasury can lengthen maturity. The horizontal axis is the maturity in
years and the blue curves are some generic yield curve. The Treasury is trying to raise the average maturity of by issuing debt at some
longer maturities. In (a), it issues only 10 year bonds. In (b), it issues three equal portions at 5-, 10- and 30-years respectively. The
two figures help illustrate the empirical observation that when the Treasury lengthens the maturity of issuance, it tends to spread the
issuance on multiple points of maturity rather than concentrating on a single point.
The second stylized fact tells us that when the Treasury lengthens the average maturity,
it tends to spread new issuances across the maturity spectrum. To illustrate what this
means, I provide a generic example in Figure (2.4). In this example, the Treasury is trying
to raise the average maturity of the debt stock by issuing $10 billion (exogenous borrowing
need) at some longer maturities. Instead of issuing $10 bil of 10 year bond, the Treasury
has tended to issue $3.3 billion of 5 year bond and $3.3 billion of 10 year bond and $3.3
billion of 30 year bond. To show that this is the case historically, I plot the weighted
average maturity of issuance against three different measures of the maturity dispersion of
new issuances. The first measure is the count of the number of unique maturities issued in
a quarter. For example, if the Treasury sells $5 billion of three month bills in eight separate
auctions, $5 billion of five year bonds in two auctions and $10 billion of ten year bonds in
two auctions, the measure will simply record 3. Because shorter-term bonds are auctioned
more regularly than long-term bonds, this measure distinguishes for example five auctions
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Figure 2.5: Maturity Is Extended By Spreading Issuance Across the Yield Curve
All three figures depict the smoothed weighted average maturity of new issuances. Figure (a) plots the number of unique maturities,
which exceed 2 years, issued in a quarter. For example, if within a quarter 2 auctions of 10 year bonds are conductions, they count
only as one. Figure (b) computes the standard deviation of the maturities of all the securities with maturity longer than 2 years issued
within a quarter. Figure (c) is sum of the unique maturities issued in a quarter.
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of 2 year bonds in a quarter from two auctions of 2 year bonds plus two auctions of 10
year bonds in a quarter. Effectively, this measure overweights the longer-term and less
frequently issued maturities in order to more accurately capture the maturity dispersion.
The top subfigure in Figure (2.5) shows a clear positive correlation between the weighted
average maturity of issuance and this maturity count measure.
To show that the relationship between the issuance maturity and the maturity disper-
sion is not mechanical, I define two additional measures. The second measure, as in the
middle subfigure of Figure (2.5), is the standard deviation of the maturities of the new
issuances, which is taken over all individual securities issued within a quarter. The third
measure, as in the bottom subfigure in Figure (2.5), is the sum of the unique maturities
within a quarter. In the example of the first measure, this would be the sum of 2, 5 and 10,
which gives us 17 years. Both of these measures again affirm the observation the extension
of the issuance maturity is accomplished by spreading the issuance across the yield curve.
The regression results in Table 2.1 confirm the strong positive correlations in Figure (2.5).
Table 2.1: Regression of Weighted Average Maturity of Issuance on Measures of Issuance Dispersion
(1) (2) (3)
Year 1950-2017 Year 1950-2017 Year 1950-2017
VARIABLES WAM of Issuance WAM of Issuance WAM of Issuance
mat count 0.380***
(0.017)
mat sum 0.038***
(0.002)
mat sd 0.160***
(0.014)
Constant 0.718*** 0.963*** 1.431***
(0.087) (0.071) (0.113)
Observations 266 266 241
Adjusted R-squared 0.66 0.69 0.36
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Quarterly regression of weighted average maturity of issuance on measures of the
dispersion of the maturities of the securities issued within the quarter. mat count
counts the number of unique maturities issued within the quarter. mat sum sums
up the maturities of all the securities issued within the quarter. mat sd calculates
the standard deviations of the maturities issued within the quarter. For all three
measures, I only include securities with a maturities of 2 years or more. The strong
positive correlations confirm that the issuance maturity extension is accomplished
by spreading the issuance across the yield curve.
Fact 3a: The maturity of issuance lengthens when funding need spikes
The third stylized fact deals with the maturity of issuance’s response to funding needs
and is stated in two parts: the static and dynamic responses. The first part says that the
maturity of issuance responds strongly and positively to spikes in funding needs. There
are two types of funding needs: old debt maturing and deficits. Maturing debt represents
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Figure 2.6: Weighted Average Maturity of Issuance’s Relationship to Funding Needs
These two figures show that the maturity of issuance has historically been positively correlated with the two sources of funding need as
a share of nominal GDP. The weighted average maturity of issuance is depicted in both figures. The first subfigure plots the total face
value of maturing debt, whose original maturity exceeds 2 years, as a share of the nominal GDP. The second subfigure plots the federal
deficit as a share of nominal GDP.
a mechanical funding need. Since the end of World War 1, the U.S. Treasury gradually
accepted that the government debt would not be extinguished but rather will generally
have to be refinanced.(Garbade (2012)) On the other hand, fresh deficits are structural
funding needs. In both cases, I normalize the magnitude of the funding need by dividing
the quantities by the nominal GDP.
In Figure (2.6), I show the weighted average maturity of issuance has historically been
positively correlated with both types of funding needs as a share of GDP. In the left sub-
figure in Figure (2.6), I plot the total maturing debt, whose original maturity was greater
than 2 years, in a quarter as a share of GDP next to the weighted average maturity of new
issuances in the same quarter. I only include maturing securities that were issued at least
two years ago in order to isolate the funding need arisen from decisions made some distant
time ago.22 For the purpose of plotting, the weighted average maturity of issuance shown
here is smoothed over the next three quarters. It is evident that the weighted average ma-
turity of issuance correlates positively with that of the funding need due to maturing debt.
In right subfigure of Figure (2.6), I plot the deficit-to-GDP ratio next to the same weighted
average maturity of issuance measure as in the left subfigure in Figure (2.6). The average
maturity of the new issuance is also strongly positively correlated with the deficits-to-GDP
ratio. As the funding need rises as a share of the GDP, the Treasury tends to use longer
term debt to finance it.23
22For robustness, I also try other cutoffs like 3 or 4 years, the results are qualitatively very similar.
23This finding is also echoed by some Treasury officials’ own sentiments. Larry Summers, the former U.S.
Treasury secretary, said the following in a private correspondence.(Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2015)) ”I
think the right theory is that one tries to [borrow] short to save money but not [so much as] to be imprudent
with respect to rollover risk. Hence there is certain tolerance for [short-term] debt but marginal debt once
50
Table 2.2: Regression of Weighted Average Maturity of Issuance on Measures of Funding Needs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year 1950-2007 Year 1960-2007 Year 1970-2007 Year 1980-2007 Year 1990-2007 Year 2008-2017
VARIABLES WAM of Issuance WAM of Issuance WAM of Issuance WAM of Issuance WAM of Issuance WAM of Issuance
MLD/GDP 0.781*** 1.060*** 1.170*** 0.691*** 1.019*** -0.106
(0.123) (0.147) (0.164) (0.250) (0.333) (0.246)
Deficit/GDP 1.069*** 0.875*** 0.800*** 0.655*** 0.768*** -0.257
(0.112) (0.112) (0.116) (0.132) (0.155) (0.158)
Constant 1.087*** 1.098*** 1.106*** 1.727*** 1.313*** 4.635***
(0.120) (0.143) (0.173) (0.289) (0.386) (0.599)
Observations 223 186 151 112 72 36
Adjusted R-squared 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.17 0.13 0.18
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
WAM of Issuance is the (unsmoothed) weighted average maturity of quarterly gross issuance. MLD stands for Maturing Long-term Debt,
which is the total face value of securities, whose original maturity was 2 year or more, that are maturing in this quarter. The main
specification is column (2) with the sample between 1960 and 2007. The sample is cut off in 2007 because there appears to be a structural
break in the relationship after 2007.
In Table 2.2, I regress quarterly weighted average maturity of issuance on the maturing
long debt to GDP ratio and the deficit to GDP ratio. Consistent with Figure (2.6), the WAM
of issuance is statistically significantly related to the maturing debt to GDP ratio and the
deficit to GDP ratio. While the main specification covers the sample from 1960 onwards,
I have run the regression on different time sub-samples and also extended the sample
backwards to 1950. The coefficients on LMD/GDP ratio are comparable across the different
time sub-samples and the coefficients on the deficit/GDP ratio show a slight decline in
magnitude suggesting that the Treasury used to lengthen maturity more aggressively to a
deficit or structural shock to the funding need. The relationship between issuance maturity
and the two funding need measures breaks down between 2008 and 2017. In particular,
as deficits significantly declines the maturity of issuance stays relatively elevated. This is
likely due to the unique economic environment since the 2008 financial crisis.24 Taking
column (2) as the main specification, the coming due of long-term debt worth 5 percent of
GDP corresponds to a lengthening of the weighted average maturity by about 0.05 years.
This compares with an average weighted average maturity of 2.35 years between 1960
and 2007. A quarterly increase in deficit worth 2 percent of GDP corresponds to about
0.0175 years increase in weighted average maturity.
[total] debt goes up has to be more long term.” Other Treasury officials have expressed similar sentiments
in the their consultations with primary market dealers. (Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee (1982-
2017a))
24Greenwood et al. (2014) suggest that the Treasury took advantage of the quantitative easing program
and the increase demand for long term Treasury to issue more long term debt and capture the low cost of
borrowing.
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Fact 3b: Issuance maturity has a temporary response to maturing debt and a persis-
tent response to deficit
In the second part of the third stylize fact, I document that the issuance maturity has
very different dynamic responses to maturing debt/GDP and deficit/GDP shocks. I use
a vector-autoregressive (VAR) model involving maturing debt-GDP ratio, deficit-GDP ratio
and the WAM of issuance to capture these dynamic relationships. The details of the VAR
model setup are in the appendix and the results are illustrated in Figure (2.7). The first
subfigure in Figure (2.7) shows that the response of the weighted average maturity of is-
suance to debt maturing is initially positive and statistically significant but fades away in
about four quarters. (The coefficient becomes statistically insignificant and hence indis-
tinguishable from zero.) Because the funding need due to maturing long-term debt is a
mechanical one, the rise in issuance maturity could be interpreted as the Treasury’s desire
to “replace” maturing long-term debt in order to maintain a stationary weighted average
maturity of the overall debt stock.25 As will be spelled more specifically in the theory sec-
tion below, the desire to maintain a stationary average maturity that’s neither too low or
too high is likely motivated by both a desire for borrowing cost savings and an aversion to-
ward rollover risk. In contrast, in the second subfigure in Figure (2.7) we see a much more
persistent rise in issuance maturity in response to a deficit-to-GDP ratio shock. The funding
need created by deficits is structural and likely unanticipated. If the Treasury decides to
finance the deficits with long-term bonds but faces a somewhat inelastic demand curve for
long-term bonds, it may choose to implement the maturity lengthening over many quarters
into the future.26 This finding is also consistent with the second stylized fact that when the
Treasury lengthens maturity, it has tended to spread the issuance over many points on the
maturity spectrum.
Fact 4: Treasury tends to issue long term debt when term premium is high
The fourth and final stylized fact is that the Treasury has historically issued long-term
debt exactly when the term spread and the term premium are the highest. It has been
shown that the issuance maturity is strongly and positively correlated with the size of fund-
ing needs, particularly the deficits/GDP. An increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio leads to a
positive and sustained increase in the weighted average maturity of Treasury issuances.
Figure (2.8) shows that there is a strong relationship over time between deficits and the
25While it is true that all maturing debts are really debts with near-zero maturity, if the policy of replacing
the same security with that of the same maturity does produce a steady state of relatively stable maturity
structure.
26This is particularly the case if the deficit shock are persistent.
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Figure 2.7: Dynamic Response of Maturity to Funding Needs
The impulse responses are generated from a VAR with two lags using quarterly data 1960 and 2007. The VAR involves three variables:
maturing long term debt to GDP ratio, quarterly deficit to GDP ratio and the weighted average maturity of new issuances. The first
subfigure shows that a maturing debt shock has a positive but temporary impact on the maturity of new issuances. The effect fades
away (no longer statistically significant) in about 4 quarters. The second subfigure shows that a deficit shock has a positive but much
more persistent effect on the maturity of new issuances.
Figure 2.8: Deficit and The Term Spread
This plot is generated and downloaded from FRED database at the St. Louis Fed . The plotted curves are (1) monthly term-spread of
10 year Treasury yield and the 3 month Treasury bill rate; and (2) yearly deficit-to-GDP ratio. There is a clearly negative correlation
between the Deficit/GDP ratio and the term spread. Ignoring the high-frequency noises in the term spread, the term spread tends to be
at a peak when the deficit/GDP ratio is at a trough (high deficits).
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spread between short and long term interest rates. It is well known that the inversion of
the yield curve (negative term spread) has been a powerful predictor of impending U.S.
recessions since the end of WWII. However, it has been less often observed that by the time
the federal deficits actually arrive the yield curve has typically become positively sloped
again.27 In Figure (2.8), between 1950 and 2017 the troughs of the deficit/GDP ratio
have consistently coincided with local peaks of the term spread between the 10 year Trea-
sury yield and the 3 month Treasury bill rate. The peaks of the deficit/GDP ratios have
coincided with the local troughs of the term spread.28
Since the issuance maturity tends to lengthen with spikes in the deficit/GDP ratio, it
also tends to lengthen when the term spread is largest. Indeed, column (1) of Table 2.3
confirms this positive relationship between the issuance maturity and the term spread. To
the extent that the term spread is a crude measure of the relative expensiveness of short-
term and long-term bonds, this seems to suggest that the Treasury has tended to issue more
long-term debt when the long-term debt is more expensive. Because long-term interest
rates are known to contain expectations about the path of future short-term interest rates,
the term spread cannot be readily interpreted as the true relative expensiveness of long-
term bonds to short-term bonds.29 Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) propose a successful
predictor of excess returns of long term bonds using a combination of forward rates. Using
this alternative measure of bond term premium, I show in column (3) of table 2.3 that
the issuance maturity tends to be positively correlated with a purer measure of bond term
premium.
In column (2) and (4) of table 2.3, I include the two funding needs that are drivers
of the issuance maturity as controls. Both measures of the term premium are no longer
positive and statistically significant. In fact, the term spread has become negative and sta-
tistically significantly. It is perhaps unsurprising that the controls, particularly the deficits,
should squeeze out the term spread as a positive driver of the issuance maturity given the
strong correlation between the two. Because the issuance maturity rises the most when
the deficit/GDP ratio rises most sharply, the deficit/GDP ratio may simply be a less noisy
measure of the term spread than the term spread itself. The negative loading on the term
spread, after the inclusion of the controls, may be attributed to a general desire for issuing
27In fact, by the time the federal deficits arrived, the recessions have often passed. This is likely to due
to the fact that tax liabilities during a recession are predetermined by income before it and the fall in tax
revenues come with a delay.
28Here I have taken the fed funds rate as a representative of short-term interest rates because FRED plots a
nicer graph with NBER recession indicators. However, the pattern is pretty identical if the 3 month Treasury
bill rate is used instead.
29A higher long-term bond yield doesn’t necessarily mean a higher cost of borrowing if it simply reflects
the expectation of the path of future short-term interest rates.
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short-term debt in response to higher relative cost of long-term borrowing.30
Table 2.3: Regression of Weighted Average Maturity of Issuance on Term Spread and Term Premium
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year 1960-2007 Year 1960-2007 Year 1965-2007 Year 1965-2007
VARIABLES WAM of Issuance WAM of Issuance WAM of Issuance WAM of Issuance
10Y-3M Bill Rate 0.104*** -0.096***
(0.037) (0.034)
MLD/GDP 2.380*** 2.588***
(0.306) (0.276)
Deficit/GDP 0.870*** 0.799***
(0.099) (0.083)
CP 5Y Term Premium 0.074*** -0.010
(0.024) (0.019)
Constant 2.319*** 1.481*** 2.331*** 1.363***
(0.071) (0.094) (0.074) (0.091)
Observations 204 204 184 184
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.41 0.04 0.51
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Quarterly regression of weighted average maturity of issuance on the term spread and a measure of term
premium. Column (1) shows that the issuance maturity is strongly and positively correlated with the
term spread between 10 year Treasury yield and the 3 month Treasury bill rate. In Column (3), I use a
measure of term or risk premium of long term bond from Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) to capture the
relative expensiveness of long-term bonds. Column (2) and (4) put in the other two drivers of issuance
maturity as controls. In both instances, the term spread and the CP term premium cease being positive
and statistically significant. This is likely because the Deficit/GDP is a less noisy measure of heightened
structural funding needs and heightened bond risk premium.
2.5 A Simple Model of Debt Issuance
2.5.1 Setup
In this section I present a simple model of the Treasury debt management problem
while capturing some of the salient stylized facts presented above. In contrast with nor-
mative models of debt management, this model captures the practical incentives and con-
straints faced by the Treasury debt manager that are informed by historical evidence and
institutional details.31 In a static model, the Treasury debt manager minimizes the single
period cost of borrowing as well as a measure of “roll-over” risk. Specifically, the debt
manager solves the following optimization problem.
30It is possible that the Treasury officials have used the term spread as a crude gauge for term premium
rather than explicitly estimating the actual term premium. Perusing the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Com-
mittee’s minutes and reports to the Treasury, I find many instances of references to the slope of the yield
curve in relation to cost of borrowing but no mentioning of a distinction between the term spread and the
term premium.
31In mainstream macroeconomics, the benchmark view is that the timing of debt and its maturity struc-
ture are both irrelevant given fiscal policies because of the Ricardian equivalence principle. The normative
models, in which debt maturity structure matters, typically seek to maximize welfare by minimizing tax
distortions caused by the maturity structure and timing of borrowing.
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min
Bi
B1 (1 + y1) +B2 (1 + y2) + γ
(B1 − aD)
2Y
2
· 1 {B1/D > a} (2.1)
subject to the following constraints
B1 +B2 = D = X + ∆ (2.2)
y1 = y¯1 + φ1 (B1)− h (∆) (2.3)
y2 = y¯2 + φ2 (B2)− ψh (∆) , ψ ∈ (0, 1) (2.4)
φ1 (B1) ≡ 0 (2.5)
φ2 (B2) = φ2 ·
(
B2 − L¯
Y
)
· 1{B2 − L¯} (2.6)
h (∆) = ζ · h
(
∆
Y
)
(2.7)
The Treasury debt manager can finance its single period funding need D by issuing either
short-term or long-term nominal bonds. As in (2.1), it minimizes the total borrowing costs
and a quadratic measure of the roll-over risk by choosing B1 and B2. The first two terms
correspond to the one-period total borrowing cost. y1 and y2 are the (annualized) yields
to maturity of the short-term and long-term bonds.32 The third term is a measure of the
(disutility of) roll-over risk, which takes the form of a quadratic deviation of the short
debt to the total issuance ratio from a certain target ratio a. The quadratic variation is
normalized by the size the of economy so the whole term is on the same order of magnitude
as the previous two terms. This penalty term is triggered when the target ratio is exceeded.
γ is a risk-aversion parameter and 1 is an indicator function. The disutility of roll-over risk
is greater when the amount of debt is greater. This objective is both very intuitive and also
explicitly voiced by the Treasury officials. With a shorter maturity, the amount of debt that
must be rolled over each period is greater, which increases the (tail) risk of insufficient
demand and the price impact of bond sales or equivalently borrowing costs. The Treasury
officials as well as active market participants have frequently referenced the importance of
not exceeding some threshold ratio for short-term bond issuance.33
32This model compresses a multi-period problem into a single period by measuring the cost of a long-term
bond in terms of its yield to maturity. One way to think about this model is to think of the Treasury debt
management in a steady state. I do not require that the bonds are zero coupon bonds.
33I find frequent references to such a threshold in the minutes and reports of the Treasury Borrowing
Advisory Committee. For example, in their report to the Treasury secretary Treasury Borrowing Advisory
Committee (1982 Q1) state: ”Past principles of regularity and predictability of offerings, the use of the
auction techniques, the striving for a positively sloped yield curve and the mix of no more than 25 - 30% in
bills are only reinforced in today’s environment.”
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Equations (2.2)-(2.7) are the constraints faced by the debt manager. X is the total
face value of the expiring Treasury securities, which must be rolled over and financed by
new debts. ∆ is the amount of fresh deficit, which is allowed to be negative or a surplus.
Together they comprise the total funding need D in the period. y¯1 and y¯2 are some baseline
values of the short and long yields. I assume that y¯2 > y¯1 or that the baseline yield curve
is generally upward-sloping. h (·) in equation (2.3) is a positive and increasing function
of the deficit (normalized by the exogenous output Y ) with h′(·) > 0. This reflects the
empirical regularity that the nominal rate decreases in response to a deficit shock (an
adverse aggregate shock). This could be due to a combination of the central bank cutting
nominal short rates in response to adverse aggregate shocks to the economy and the so
called ”flight to safety”. ψ in equation (2.4) is number between zero and one. It means
that for a given deficit shock the long bond yield does not decrease by as much as the
short yield. This is either because of the expectation that the short yield may mean-revert
in the future or the risk premium embedded in the long yield over the uncertainty about
future short rates. Finally, the φi(·) functions in equations (2.3) and (2.4) represent the
assumption that the demand curves for Treasury bonds can be downward-sloping. For
simplicity, I assume that the demand for short-term bonds is perfectly elastic so φ1(·) ≡ 0.
However, for long-term bonds I assume that the the bond investors are willing to absorb
an inelastic supply of long-term debt L¯ beyond which the additional supply of long-term
bonds depresses the price of the long-term bond and hence raises the long yield.
For simplicity, the model can be restated in ratios rather than levels. Assuming D to be
exogenous for now, divide the objective function (2.1) and let s = B1/D denote the share
of short-term debt issuance. The debt manager’s problem can then be restated as follows.
min
s
sy1 + (1− s) y2 + γd(s− a)
2
2
· 1 {B1/D > a} (2.8)
s.t.
y1 = y¯1 − h (δ) (2.9)
y2 = y¯2 + φ2 (s)− ψh (δ) , ψ ∈ (0, 1) (2.10)
φ2 (s) == φ2
(
B2 − L¯
)
D
· D
Y
· 1{B2 > L¯} (2.11)
= (1− s− `) · φ2d · 1 {1− s > `} (2.12)
h (δ) = ζ · h
(
∆
Y
)
(2.13)
where d = D/Y is the financing-GDP ratio and ` ≡ L¯/D.
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2.5.2 Comparative Statics
I will take the solution of the model as given and perform comparative analysis on it.
The details of the solution for the model is relegated to the appendix.
1. When the amount of deficit increases (as a share of the GDP). There are two cases:
the constrained and unconstrained cases. For illustrative purpose, I’ll present the
unconstrained case here first and leave the constrained case results to the appendix.
s∗ =
(y¯2 − ψh (δ))− (y¯1 − h (δ))
γd
+ a (2.14)
∂s∗
∂δ
=
−γd (1− ψ)h′ (δ) + γ (y¯2 − y¯1 + (1− ψ)h (δ))
(γd)2
< 0 (2.15)
This is the case if
(y¯2 − y¯1 + (1− ψ)h (δ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
benefit of shortening
< d (1− ψ)h′ (δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
disutility of rollover risk
(2.16)
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I present new stylized facts characterizing the postwar behavior of the
U.S. Treasury debt issuance policy. These empirical facts uncover the practical incentives
and constraints that face that Treasury debt managers. I document that the Treasury’s
debt management is driven by a dual goal of managing maturity and liquidity. It lengthens
maturity and issues more long-term debt when the funding need, particularly government
deficit, rises as a share of GDP. And when it tries to lengthen maturity, it tends to issue
debt on multiple maturity points rather than concentrating on a singular maturity. And
finally, I document that the issuance of longer maturity debt has tended to coincide with
periods of high relative expensiveness of long-term debt. I present a simple model that
captures the realistic incentives facing the Treasury and explain the some of the empirical
facts. In particular, the model clarifies how the management of maturity and liquidity
translates into a trade-off between conserving borrowing costs and reducing roll-over risk.
Finally, the model provides a realistic framework for understanding the rationale behind
the behavior of one of the most important financial institutions in the world over the last
half a century. It also sheds light on promising directions of future research of the supply
of safe assets.
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CHAPTER III
Earnings Announcement Premium: Evidence From Finland
Abstract
This paper investigates the earnings announcement premium puzzle in Finland. Between
1999-2002 and 2006-2009, I find that stocks with earnings announcement earn excess
returns over non-announcement stock in the 2 week window before the announcements
that quickly dissipates post-announcement. Moreover, I find that the premium is signif-
icantly higher and persistent through a 30 day window around the financial statement
releases. I find no premium around the interim earnings report and in fact accumulative
losses. I also assess the relationship between announcement premium and trading vol-
ume. Using an administrative transaction-level data set, I find some supportive evidence
for the attention-grabbing hypothesis. I find a positive correlation between the announce-
ment premium and the net-buying trading volume among individual investors, especially
around the financial statements.
JEL Codes:
Keywords: earnings announcement premium, Finnish stock market, behavioral finance,
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3.1 Introduction
The earnings announcement premium is a well known and well documented phe-
nomenon in global stock markets. It refers to a puzzling empirical pattern that the stock
prices tend to rise on average in the days around earning announcement days. This phe-
nomenon has been known at least since Beaver (1968). A more recent study by Lamont
and Frazzini (2007) documents that the earnings announcement premium is large and
robust in the U.S. since 1927. The announcing stocks tend to earn annualized monthly
excess returns over the non-announcing stocks by up to 18% with higher Sharpe ratios
than other popular anomalies.1 Barber et al. (2013) further shows that the premium also
exists across the globe in as many as 20 countries. The persistence of the premium is puz-
zling because the earnings announcement dates are typically known well ahead of time.
Investors have ample opportunities to buy up the announcing stocks during the lead-up,
bid up the stock prices, and eliminate these predictable returns.
In this paper, I document the earning announcement premium in Finland and provide
new supportive evidence for a popular behavioral explanation of the puzzle by leveraging
a unique transaction-level administrative dataset. Barber and Odean (2008) propose the
so-called “attention-grabbing” hypothesis, in which individual investors suffering from lim-
ited attention and short-sale constraints tend to exhibit a net-buying bias about any stocks
in the news. As a potential explanation for the earnings announcement premium, the idea
is that stocks with upcoming earnings announcement news are likely to catch the limited
attention of the individual investors, who would tend to respond by buying the announcing
stocks on net since they tend to be constrained from short-selling. As a result, the hypoth-
esis can contain two versions of predictions. A stronger version predicts that the rise in
announcing stock price is accompanied by a rise in overall trading volume as well, caused
by increased attention or sentiments. This is also simply known as the “volume hypothe-
sis”. A weaker version predicts that the rising stock prices are accompanied by increasing
individual net-buying orders around announcement dates. There have been other papers
that test this prediction using aggregate trading volume data relying on rather imprecise
imputation about individual transcations. This paper represents one of the first papers to
document evidence of actual individual trading behaviors around earnings announcement
dates.
With the benefit of a unique and detailed administrative data set from Finland, I ex-
amine whether earnings announcement premium is driven by the different individual and
1In the academic asset-pricing literature, the word “anomaly” roughly speaking refers to asset price be-
haviors that present ostensible arbitrage opportunities in an informationally efficient financial market.
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non-individual (institutional) trading behaviors around announcement dates.2 I perform
the analysis in two steps. In the first step, I verify and characterize the earnings announce-
ment premium in Finland on the Helsinki Stock Exchange (HEX). Furthermore, I compare
the premium’s behavior in Finland to its counterpart in the U.S. as a baseline. In the sec-
ond step, I compare the trading behaviors of individual and institutional investors around
announcement dates. I document suggestive evidence in support of the attention-grabbing
hypothesis as an explanation of the asset-pricing anomaly surrounding earnings announce-
ment dates.
Firstly, I confirm that indeed there is earning announcement premium in Finland be-
tween 1998 and 2009, but with some significant differences to the behavior of the pre-
mium in the U.S. stock markets. Lamont and Frazzini (2007) documents the premium in
the U.S. stock markets with a symmetrical 20-day window around announcement dates.
Averaging over all announcement windows between 1973 and 2004, they find a concurrent
and continuous rise in the cumulative excess returns and the cumulative abnormal trading
volume of the announcing stocks.3 I perform similar event studies on the Finnish stock
market using symmetrical time windows. In Finland, the average behavior of stock prices
and trading volume is similar to the U.S. market before the earnings announcements. On
average, I observe a significant rise of the price of the announcing stock and a significant
initial drop in trading volume leading up to the earnings announcement. The trading vol-
ume spikes up on the eve of the earnings announcement, continues to drift up, and starts
to taper off about five days after the event. However, in contrast with the U.S. case, the
average stock price starts to fall almost immediately after the announcement such that the
cumulative excess returns of announcing stocks over 30 days will be zero on average.
Underneathe the difference in the unconditional average behaviors between the U.S.
and Finland lies the fact that the stock prices in Finland behave very differently around
different types of earnings announcement events. In Finland, each public firm has four
annual earning announcement events: one annual financial statement release and three
interim earnings releases. When focusing on the average premium over the annual fi-
nancial statement releases, I find that there is an average 1.5% earnings announcement
premium held through a 30 day window. However, over the other three interim earnings
2The data set will be discussed in greater detail in the dedicated data section. However, briefly speaking
this is a comprehensive transaction-level data set covering all stock trades, by individuals and institutions,
on the Helsinki Stock Exchange between 1998 and 2009. The proprietary access was provided to the author
through the University of Michigan Ross School of Business.
3Excess return is defined as the daily return minus an equal weighted portfolio of non-announcing stocks.
Scaled volume is defined as share volume in month t divided by average volume in the previous 250 trading
days. Abnormal volume is defined as the scaled volume minus the equal weight average of scaled volume
for all stocks on that day.
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releases, I find that over a 30 day window the cumulative excess returns of announcing
stocks are on average negative. These findings are consistent with the cross-country study
by Barber et al. (2013), which find significant announcement premium around annual
financial statements but no evidence of any premium for the interim quarterly earnings
announcements.
In the second part of the exercise, I document the significantly different trading behav-
iors of individuals versus institutions around earnings announcement events. I find that on
average around announcement dates individuals indeed tend to generate more net buy-
ing volume while institutions tend to generate more net selling volume. This evidence is
consistent with the hypothesis that individuals tend to buy stocks that grab their attention,
which in this case are assumed to be the stocks with upcoming earnings announcements.
It is also consistent with the conjecture that individuals are short-sale constrained and
therefore they tend to on average be buying more than selling.
3.2 Relation to Literature
This paper sits inside a sizable literature on explaining the earnings announcement pre-
mium puzzle. In particular, it contributes to a set of studies providing explanations that
are based on the empirical correlation between the stock returns and the trading volume.
The most closely related paper to this study is Lamont and Frazzini (2007). It is one of the
first papers to test the attention-grabbing hypothesis as an explanation for the earnings an-
nouncement premium.4 They document that U.S. stocks with high trading volume around
earnings announcements have subsequently high premiums and high imputed buying by
individual investors. Lamont and Frazzini (2007) must impute the individual buying vol-
ume based on some highly imperfect assumptions.5 For example, they impute whether an
order is initiated as a buy or sell based on the price’s position in the most recent bid/ask
spread. Furthermore, an order is imputed as coming from an individual based on some
dollar amount threshold for the trade size. These assumptions are acknowledged by the
authors to be less reliable in the modern market environment, where algorithmic trading
has enable large orders from institutions to be processed in sequences of small orders.
This paper has the advantage that each transaction is clearly reported as either buyer- or
seller-initiated and whether it comes from individuals or institutions.
Another closely related paper is Barber et al. (2013) which documents and analyzes the
4Lamont and Frazzini (2007) was based on a 2004 working paper version of Barber and Odean (2008).
5This is because they obtain the stock transactions from the NYSE Trade and Quote database, which does
not report whether a transaction is a buy or sell or whether the trader is an individual or an institution.
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earnings announcement premium in non-U.S. stock markets. Of the 46 countries (includ-
ing Finland) examined, they find significantly positive premium in nine markets but that
most of the excess returns are concentrated in the pre-announcement window. Further-
more, contrary to a prediction of the attention-grabbing hypothesis, they find on average
negative correlation between the announcement premium and trading volume. Similar
to Barber et al. (2013), I do not find an unconditional earnings announcement premium
in Finland from 1998-2009, but do find an average premium around the annual financial
statement release events. Furthermore, I find a negative relationship between the trading
volume and the excess returns of the announcing stocks. Yet, I argue that this does not
necessarily rule out the attention-grabbing hypothesis as an explanation. Indeed, after
separating the individual and institutional orders, I find that individuals are generating
net buying volume of he announcing stocks and it is rising with the excess returns. Since
institutions typically form the majority of the trading volume in a market, it is plausible to
have an increase in individual net buying volume while the overall trade volume falls. The
prices of the announcing stocks are driven up by the net-buying from individual investors,
which is consistent with the attention-grabbing hypothesis.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning briefly several other papers that have used the same
Finnish data set to analyze investor behaviors around earnings announcements. Ekholm
(2006) studies the period 1994-2000 and reports that most Finnish investors tend to sell
(buy) stocks after a positive (negative) earnings surprise. Moreover, they are biased to-
wards buying immediately after an annual financial statement release. Consistent with the
spirit of this paper, they find that large investors tend show opposite behaviors to the rest.
While I do not examine earnings surprises in this paper, the contrarian behavior of individ-
ual investors is consistent with our finding that individuals are buying as stock prices fall
while institutions are on average selling. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) also finds that
domestic investors in Finland tend to be contrarian investors and generally underperform
compared with foreign investors in Finland who tend to be momentum investors.
In section 3 I will describe the data used in this paper. In section 4, I describe the
methodology for identifying earnings announcement premium in the Finnish stock market
and the trading behaviors of different investor groups. In section 5, I present and discuss
the empirical findings. Section 6 will conclude.
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3.3 Data
In this paper, I use two types of data on the Helsinki Stock Exchange(HEX) between
1998 and 2009.6 The first type of data is hand-collected market data. I gather the earnings
announcement dates as well as end-of-day daily stock prices of all public companies listed
on the exchange during this period. The second type of data is transaction-level micro data.
The data on individual and institutional transactions, which comes from a proprietary
administrative data set that will be described in details here.
Before discussing the data-gathering process, a brief introduction of the Finnish stock
market is in order. The Helsinki Stock Exchange (HEX), which is the only stock market in
Finland, is a very small and highly concentrated stock market.7 As of the end of 2000, the
HEX has a total market capitalization worth $349 billion in USD or about 1% of the world’s
total market cap, as compared to the U.S. total stock market capitalization of $16,635
billion or 46% of the world’s.8 Between the year 1998 and the 2009, the HEX had between
120 and 150 listed companies, as compared to an average over 3000 listings on the New
York Stock Exchange alone. Finally, the HEX is also the world’s most concentrated stock
market. As of the end of 2000, the largest three stocks on the HEX make up 79% of
the total market capitalization and the biggest company (Nokia) alone makes up 70% of
the total market cap. Taken together, these features of the HEX create some significant
challenges for analyzing and interpreting the price behaviors. It also means that one has
to be careful with drawing external inference from these results in Finland.
3.3.1 Announcement Dates and Market Prices
Now I will discuss the public disclosure rules on the HEX. In Finland, the publicly listed
firms are required to file three interim reports (IR) and an annual financial statement
(FS). In addition, there is usually an annual general meeting (AGM). Therefore, each
public company has as many as five regular planned earnings-related dates in a year. The
financial statement release typically occurs sometime in the first quarter of the calendar
year. In addition to discussing the earnings in the previous quarter, it also summarizes
the earnings performance of the firm in the previous year. The three interim earnings
reports are more or less evenly spaced throughout the other three quarters of the year.
The AGM occurs typically in the first quarter close to the financial statement release date.
Some companies combine the financial statement release with the AGM. Importantly, the
6I cut the sample in 2009 because that is when the coverage of the administrative transactions data set
ends
7The HEX, through a sequence of mergers and acquisitions, is now part of the Nasdaq Nordic.
8Data source: Dimson, Marsh and Stanton (2002)
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earnings announcement dates are pre-announced at the beginning of each calendar year
with adjustments usually within the same week. Therefore it is possible to keen investors
to be aware of them and act in anticipation of them.
The earnings announcement dates between 1998 and 2009 are collected in two time
blocks each from a different source. The first block, which covers a selection of the listed
companies from 1999 through 2002, is downloaded from the Bloomberg terminal . The
second block, which covers all the listed companies from 2006 through 2009, is manually
collected from the Helsinki Stock Exchange website.
Finally, I also obtain from the Bloomberg terminal the end of day daily prices all listed
and delisted stocks on the HEX between 1998 and 2009.
3.3.2 Transaction-level Stock Trade Data
The trade by trade stock transaction data comes a proprietary database called the
Finnish Central Securities Depository (FCSD) Registry. This paper is crucially enabled
by the access to the unique and detailed data set. The Finnish government mandates that
all stock trades must be registered in great detail with this database. It records all stock
trades and daily portfolios of all the Finnish households and institutions investing in the
HEX. I have access to the data set from Jan 1995 through June 2009.9 Because this is an
official administrative data set is, it is very accurate and reliable.
The FCSD database contains detailed information on each stock transaction as well as
supplementary information on the trading entities. Each transaction observation contains:
the trade date, type of order (market/limit), the security identifier (ISIN), the legal form
of the investor, buy- or a sell-initiated order status, the quantity, and the price at which
the order is fulfilled when available. Additionally, the database provides basic biometric
information on the individuals, such as gender and primary language. For institutional
investors, the database contains industry codes.
The FCSD database also provides market-wide information such as the daily returns
and trading volume of each stock. However, this data set appears to be incomplete as
it does not completely overlap or contain the price and volume data from Bloomberg. I
supplement this data set with the Bloomberg data where it is missing, however, maintain
the data as is where they disagree.The earnings announcement premiums are calculated
using the combined data set.
9This is the end of my access. The database continues to be updated til the present day.
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3.4 Methodology
In this section, I introduce the methodology used to estimate the earnings announce-
ment premiums and measure the trading volume patterns around the announcements.
Following Lamont and Frazzini (2007), I employ primarily event studies methods to ana-
lyze the excess returns and the behaviors of the trading volumes. Specifically, I construct
measures of 1) excess returns of announcing stocks; 2) “excess” or abnormal trading vol-
ume of announcing stocks; 3) excess net buying/selling by individual investors and finally
4) the standard errors of the cumulative measures.
Daily Abnormal Returns
If there is earnings announcement premium, then on average the stocks with upcom-
ing earnings announcements are supposed to outperform stocks without announcements.
Specifically, in a relatively small window around the earnings announcement date, the cu-
mulative returns of the announcing stocks in excess of the non-announcing stocks should
be positive and significant.
The abnormal return of a firm j on day t is defined as its stock return on that day minus
the unweighted average returns of the non-announcing stocks.10 Let t be the calendar day
of the event and let T + 1 be the length of the event window.11 For example, if we are
looking at a 40 day symmetrical window about an earnings event, then T + 1 = 41, with
the additional day being the event itself in the middle. Finally, let the capital letter A
denote the set of announcing stocks and the symbol ∼ A denote the set of stocks that do
not have any announcement events during this time window.
In mathematical symbols, the abnormal return is defined as follows.
ARjt =RET
j
t −
1
N∼A
∑
i∈∼A
RETjt (3.1)
The daily abnormal return is equivalent to the trading strategy of forming a so called “long-
short portfolio” of earnings announcement stocks. On any given day, the expression (3.1)
tracks the returns from buying and holding (long) a dollar worth of the announcing stock
while short-selling (short) a dollar worth of the unweighted group of the non-announcing
10The reason I use “unweighted” average is so that that the average return of the non-announcing stocks
is not alway dominated by the returns of the biggest stocks that happen to be not announcing on those
days. An alternative is to exclude the largest stocks and do a weighted average. I have tried both of those
approaches and the results are similar.
11I consider multiple time window lengths, e.g., T = 20, 30 or 40.
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stocks.12
Furthermore, I define a related measure: the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). This
is a sequence of T+1 numbers that tracks the cumulative returns from a strategy of holding
the long-short portfolio of the announcing stocks. This allows us to most clearly visualize
the presence of any earnings announcement premiums.
CARjt,h =
h−T/2+1∑
i=−T/2+1
ARjt+i, h = 1, . . . , T + 1 (3.2)
For each firm and each announcement date, I generate
{
CARjt
}T+1
h=1
, which is a T +1 day
path. Finally, the unconditional average behavior of the excess returns is an unweighted
average of all the paths. Naturally, the conditional average behavior, e.g., the premium
around only financial statement dates, is just an average taken over those specific in-
stances. If there exists an earnings announcement premium (over a certain horizon), then
the CAR curve should end up positive and statistically significant at the end of the time
window. However, note that because these measures are constructed based on event days,
whatever premiums detected do not reflect a feasible trading strategy since the earnings
announcement dates may have varied slightly from when it was first announced.
Daily Abnormal Volume
The volume hypothesis predicts that the trading volume of the announcement stocks
should rise in tandem with the stock prices around announcement dates. To assess this
hypothesis, I define a measure of abnormal trading volume of the announcement stocks.
Because trading volume varies significantly in the cross section, a more natural way of
gauging whether there is additional trading volume is by comparing a stock’s trading vol-
ume against its own historical levels. To that end, I define a measure called “scaled volume”
following Lamont and Frazzini (2007). The scaled volume of a firm j on date t is the ratio
between the firm j’s share volume on date t and the firm’s average share volume over the
previous 250 trading days.13 Mathematically this is represented as follows.
12Because of the heavily distorted nature of the market cap distribution on the HEX, such a strategy may
have serious limitation in its scalability. For example, one may not be able to easily put as much money into
the smaller companies as the bigger companies. Though this is perhaps a common problem for this strategy
on any stock market, it could be particularly severe on the HEX.
13250 days because this is roughly the number of trading days in a year in Finland as well.
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SVjt =
VOLjt
1
250
∑−1
s=−251 VOL
j
t+s
(3.3)
In other words, with this measure, we are asking ”how big is today’s trading volume rela-
tive to its normal level?”.
Then an announcing firm j’s idiosyncratic abnormal volume on date t is defined as its
scaled volume on date t minus the average market scaled volume on the same day. This is
the volume analogue of “excess returns” as it compares the (self-)abnormal volume of the
announcing stock against the abnormal volume of the rest of the market, in particular the
non-announcing stocks.14
AVjt =SV
j
t −
1
N
N∑
i=1
SVit (3.4)
=SVjt − SVjt (3.5)
Because the trading volume is calculated on the units of shares rather than the dollar-value
of the orders, an equal-weighted cross-sectional average of trading volume is equivalent to
a value-weighted average of dollar-valued trading volumes.
Similar to returns, I define a cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) measure, which helps
us visualize the pattern of trading volume changes.
CAVjt,h =
h−T/2+1∑
i=−T/2+1
AVjt+i, h = 1, . . . , T + 1 (3.6)
Finally, under the null hypothesis of there being no announcement effect, we should
expect both abnormal returns and abnormal volumes to be zero. Equivalently, we should
expect to see both CAR and CAV as flat lines at zero. Under the volume hypothesis, we
expect to see a simultaneous increase in CAR and CAV around the announcement dates.
Order Imbalances By Investor Groups
In order to assess the attention-grabbing hypothesis, specifically that the announcement
premium is driven by buying pressure from individual investors, I construct measures of
14An alternative measure would be to exclude the announcing stocks from the second term. However, I
keep this format for comparability with the Lamont and Frazzini (2007) paper. I have tried the other way. It
does not make a qualitatively difference.
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net trading volume for each investor group.15 I construct a net buy metric for each investor
group. For each investor group, (individual/institution), the net buy metric for firm j on
date t is defined as the ratio between the difference of the total buy-initiated volume and
total sell-initiated volume and the firm j’s average daily trading volume over the previous
250 trading days. For example, the individual net-buy metric for firm j on date t is defined
as follows.
Net BuyIndj,t =
BuyIndj,t − SellIndj,t
1
250
∑−1
s=−251 VOL
j
t+s
(3.7)
where BuyIndj,t represents the total buy-initiated share volume by individual investors and
SellIndj,t represents the total sell-initiated share volume by individual investors. Note be-
cause I can observe directly whether a trader order is originally placed as a buy or sell
order and by what investor type, I do not need to make any imputations about these quan-
tities unlike Lamont and Frazzini (2007). Each order is assigned correctly to be either
buy-initiated or sell-initiated. Similarly, I define a net buy metric for institutional investors
Net BuyInsj,t =
BuyInsj,t − SellInsj,t
1
250
∑−1
s=−251 VOL
j
t+s
(3.8)
Because the total net buy volumes between individuals and institutions should sum
to zero, it is expected that a positive net-buy volume by individuals will be accompanied
by a negative net-sell volume by institutions if the data is accurate. Furthermore, these
measures can exceed 100% if the trading of a stock is infrequent and generally inactive, in
which case any active trading day can easily see volumes that are several times larger than
the average. Finally, I define as above a cumulative version of the net-buy metric to help
us visualize the accumulative impact of investor actions by investor types.
CNB“type”j,t,h =
h−T/2+1∑
i=−T/2+1
NB“type”j,t+i , h = 1, . . . , T + 1 (3.9)
15Ideally, I should look specifically at investors who do not already know the announcing stocks to tease
out the short-sale constraint from the limited attention story. This is technically also feasible because the
data set contains information on individual portfolios. However, this was given up because the relatively
infrequent trading among households that such restriction would have cut down the sample too much to
have any statistical powers to draw inferences.
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The attention-grabbing hypothesis explanation especially applied to individuals pre-
dicts that the cumulative net-buying by individual investors should be rising with the ex-
cess returns of the announcing stocks.
Cumulative Standard Errors
For all three cumulative measures, CAR, CAV and CNB, I apply the same method for
calculating standard errors. Let X denote either AR, AV ro NB as defined above. I assume
that X is serially uncorrelated, then the standard errors of the cumulative version of X can
be calculated as follows.
se (CX) =
√
se (X1)
2 + se (X2)
2 + · · ·+ se (XT+1)2 (3.10)
The confidence interval bounds can be generated using standard errors if we assume X is
i.i.d. normal. An alternative is to bootstrap the quantiles from the empirical distribution.
3.5 Empirical Results
The empirical results will be discussed in three main steps. In the first steps, I examine
the earnings announcement premium, the trading volume of the announcing stocks and
the relationship between them or the so called volume hypothesis. In the second step, I dig
a little deeper into the earning announcement premium by looking at the excess returns of
the announcing stocks around different types of announcements. In the third step, I take
a closer look into the trade volume pattern. I look at the net-buying pressure from indi-
vidual and institutional investors separately. Finally, I use the results from the second and
third steps to assess the attention-grabbing hypothesis, which suggests that the earnings
announcement premium could be driven by individual investors buying announcement
stocks that catch their attention.
3.5.1 The Earnings Announcement Premium And Volume Hypothesis
In this section,I present the results on the unconditional excess returns around the earn-
ings announcements as well as assess the volume hypothesis. The analysis is conducted
using daily event studies. In other words, I calculate the cumulative abnormal returns and
cumulative abnormal trading volume in a tight time window around the announcement
days. This methodology is chosen because of the limited availability of earning announce-
ment dates that would allow us the infer the excess returns of a monthly-rebalanced long-
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Figure 3.1: Unconditional Average CAR and CAV Around Earnings Announcements
This figure shows event-time daily cumulative abnormal return and cumulative turnover in trading day t + k for firms announcing
earnings at date t. Abnormal return is defined as daily return minus an equally weighted portfolio of non-announcing firms. Scaled
volume is defined as share volume on day t divided by average volume in the previous 250 trading days. Abnormal volume is defined
as scaled volume minus the equal weight average of scaled volume for all firms on that day. Volume and return are in percent.
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Figure 3.2: Average CAR and CAV Around Earnings Announcements in the US
This figure is taken from Lamont and Frazzini (2007) for comparison with the Finland results in Figure (3.1). It depicts the cumulative
abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcements in the U.S. between 1973 and 2004 for firms above
the median market capitalization of the CRSP firms. The definitions of measures of returns and volume are the same as this paper.
short portfolio strategy. Moreover, as will be seen below, that to the extent that there is
some run up of excess returns around the announcements, most of it is earned (and sub-
sequently lost) in the 10 days around the announcements. This motivates the choice of
using a daily event study rather than a monthly portfolio analysis.
In the time periods 199-2002 and 2006-2009, I find evidence of earnings announce-
ment premium and a relative elevation of idiosyncratic trading volume around announce-
ment dates. Figure (3.1) depicts the average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and
average cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) as defined in equations (3.2) and (3.6).16
The standard errors are reported in the appendix. I also include Figure (3.2), which is the
same plot but for the U.S. stocks borrowed from Lamont and Frazzini (2007), as a baseline
comparison. Looking at Figure (3.1), there is clearly a run up of CAR or premium up to
the announcement day. There is a run-up around 1% within the 15 trading days prior to
the announcement. Even if within the 10 trading days prior to the announcement, there is
a 80 basis points of premium. As a matter of fact most of the premium is earned within the
last five days prior to the announcement, earning as much as 90 basis points before falling
16These CAR and CAV are equal-weighted average of the CARs and CAVs at every earnings announcement
event.
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back slightly on the announcement day. The size of the premium is significantly bigger
than in the U.S.. Looking at Figure (3.2) as a comparison, the U.S. announcement stocks
only earn a premium of 40 basis points over the 10 trading days prior to the announcement
and no more than 80 basis points 10 days after.
While the pre-announcement premium in Finland differs quantitatively from that of the
U.S., the difference becomes qualitative post-announcement. As shown in Figure (3.1), the
premium earned pre-announcement is rapidly and entirely given up in the 15 trading days
after the event. In fact, similar to the run-up, about 80 basis points or 90% of the gains are
lost in merely the 5 days after. This is in contrast with the U.S. case, where the announcing
stocks see a gradual and continuous increase in cumulative abnormal returns in the 20 days
around the announcement. Both the fact that the Finland premium is larger than in the
U.S and the fact that it is only earned in prior to the announcement are consistent with the
findings in Barber et al. (2013).
Lastly, I move to discuss the trading volume and the volume hypothesis. Cumulative ab-
normal volume exhibits a significantly different pattern from cumulative abnormal returns.
In Figure (3.1) we can see that the volume is well below average before the announce-
ments. However, it spikes upward at the announcement, drifts up for about 6 trading
days before tapering off, but still remaining above average for the entire 15 days after
the announcement. While quantitatively different, the announcing stocks’ trading volume
in Finland exhibits an overall similar pattern as in the U.S. Furthermore, because the an-
nouncement premium in Finland rapidly vanishes exactly as the trading volume gathers
steam, we observe a strong negative correlation between volume and the announcement
premium both before and after the announcement. As a result, we should be able to com-
fortable reject the volume hypothesis as an explanation of the earnings announcement
premium in Finland. Yet, this is not the end of the story for trading volume as I pick it up
again later in the paper.
3.5.2 Earnings Announcement Premium By Announcement Types
In this section, I dig deeper into the earnings announcement premium by examining
for different types of earnings announcements. I find that the earnings announcement pre-
mium behaves very differently around two different types of earnings announcements. As
described in section (3.3.1), in Finland each stock has four main earnings announcements
in a year. One (annual) financial statement release and three (quarterly) interim earnings
reports. Inspired by Barber et al. (2013), I separately calculate the cumulative abnormal
returns and cumulative abnormal volume for the financial statement (FS) releases and the
interim earnings (IRS) report releases. The results are depicted in Figure (3.3) and the
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Figure 3.3: Average CAR and CAV Around Earnings Announcements By Announcement Types
This figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal volume by different types of earnings announcements. As
mentioned in section (3.3.1), in Finland each stock has four main earnings announcements in a year. One (annual) financial statement
release and three (quarterly) interim earnings reports. CAR.all and CAV.all repeat the unconditional premium and volume as in Figure
(3.1). CAR.fs and CAV.fs represent the return and volume averaged over only financial statement events. CAR.irs and CAV.irs represent
the return and volume averaged over only interim report events. Volume and return are in percent.
74
standard errors are reported in the appendix. CAR.all and CAV.all are the same premium
and volume curves as in Figure (3.1). Similarly, the suffix “.fs” represents the premium
or volume from only the financial statements, the suffix “.irs” represents the premium or
volume of the interim earnings reports.
It turns out that the financial statement premium is much higher and more persistent
than the interim earnings report premium. CAR.fs (green line) represents the excess re-
turns earned from holding the long-short portfolio of announcement stocks only around
the financial statements. The returns from the financial statement announcements are
much higher than the unconditional average premium. Pre-announcement, the premium
climbs up to over 2% over 15 trading days. After the announcement, the cumulative
premium drifts down somewhat, however still remains positive and above 1.5% after 15
trading days after the announcement. Because the unconditional premium is basically a
weighted average between the financial statement premium and the interim earnings pre-
mium, unsurprisingly the interim earnings premium is generally smaller and statistically
indistinguishable from zero and eventually ends up being negative. In other words. there
is no interim earnings announcement premium and almost of the unconditional announce-
ment premium comes from the financial statement premium. Both the magnitude and the
general pattern are consistent with the findings in Barber et al. (2013).
The trading volume around the financial statement announcement tells a similarly dra-
matic story. While volume generally decreases ahead of announcements, the trading vol-
ume around the financial statements is significantly below average by as much as 300%
below average just before the announcement. While the trading volume spikes up at the
announcement and gradually recovers, it still remains generally around average 10 days
post-announcement. On the other hand, the trading volume around the interim earnings
releases is quite similar to the unconditional CAV. This is somewhat puzzling because one
potential explanation for the higher premium around financial statements may be that
there is a lot more informational content in these releases. The general lack of trading
volume seems to undercut this explanation.
3.5.3 Trading Volume By Investor Types
The general decrease in trading volume in the lead up to the earnings announcements
is puzzling. From either an information or attention viewpoint, one would not expect a
decrease in trading volume. Moreover, the attention-grabbing hypothesis suggests that in-
dividual investors should be particularly susceptible to the pure salience-value of the earn-
ings announcement statements. Both reasons motivate a closer examination of the trading
volume around earning announcements that separate the contributions from individual
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Figure 3.4: Average CAR and CAV Around Earnings Announcements By Announcement Types
This figure depicts the unconditional premium and volume around earnings announcement. Market CAR and Market CAV are the
same CAR and CAV as in Figure(3.1) respectively. Ind.Cum.Netbuy represents the trading imbalance on the announcing stock by the
individual investors as defined in equation (3.7). Inst.Cum.Netbuy represents the trading imbalance on the announcing stock by the
institutional investors as defined in equation (3.8).
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investors from the institutions.
Upon separating the trading volume by investor legal types, I find that individual in-
vestors and institutional investors have drastically different behaviors around earnings
announcements. In particular, I define net-buying trading volume from individuals and
institutions in equations (3.7) and (3.8) respectively. These measures essentially track the
order imbalances from each investor group.
The individual investors on average tend to exert net-buying pressure around an-
nouncements while institutions tend to be net sellers. In Figure (3.4), we can see that
individual investors (green line) generate net buying volume, which rises continuously pre-
announcement reaching about 100% daily trade volume and does not begin to taper off
until 10 days post-announcement. Comparing this against the excess returns, this means
that individual investors are on net capturing the premium in the pre-announcement win-
dow. However, because the average premium is eventually completely given up soon after
the announcement and individual net-buying does not decrease immediately, individual
investors as a group probably give up all of the gains as well.
This pattern of individual investors net-buying vis-a-vis the announcement premium
is consistent with the attention-grabbing hypothesis. The earnings announcement news
grabs the attention of individual investors, who because of short-sale constraint exhibit as
a group a net-buying bias. Their net-buying bids up the stock price. Institutions, being
the more sophisticated investors, could have perceived that announcements on average do
not generate good returns so are happy to accommodate the net-buying from individual
investors.
Because the almost of all the announcement premium is earned over the financial an-
nouncements, we are naturally interested in seeing how the different investors groups
behave specifically then. Figure (3.5) shows that similar to the case with all announce-
ments, individual investors are net buyers around financial statements while institutions
are net sellers. However, in this case because the announcement premium is persistent,
the individuals investors as a group likely retain the excess returns.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the earnings announcement premium in Finland on the
Helsinki stock exchange. Looking at earnings announcement events between 1999-2002
and 2006-2009, I find that stocks with announcement do earn excess returns over non-
announcement stock in the 2 week window before the announcements. However, these
premiums are usually given up sooner after. Moreover, I find that the premium is signifi-
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Figure 3.5: Average CAR and CAV Around Earnings Announcements By Announcement Types
This figure depicts the unconditional premium and volume around financial statements. Market CAR and Market CAV are the same
CAR.fs and CAV.fs as in Figure(3.3) respectively. Ind.Cum.Netbuy represents the trading imbalance on the announcing stock by the
individual investors as defined in equation (3.7). Inst.Cum.Netbuy represents the trading imbalance on the announcing stock by the
institutional investors as defined in equation (3.8).
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cantly higher and actually persistent through a 30 day window around the annual financial
statement releases. I find no premium around the interim earnings report and in fact they
accumulate losses.
I also assess the relationship between announcement premium and trading volume in
this paper. Similar to other papers, which have examined the issue on international stock
markets, I do not find evidence in support of the so-called volume hypothesis. In general,
trading volume and the premium are negatively correlated around announcement dates.
However, I do find some supportive evidence for the attention-grabbing hypothesis. I find
a positive correlation between the announcement premium and the net-buying trading
volume among individual investors, especially around the financial statements.
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APPENDIX A
Chapter I Supporting Material
A.1 Mathematical Appendix
In this section, I will show that Ar(τ), Aβ(τ) and As(τ) and C(τ) in (1.11) are deter-
ministic functions of τ . In equilibrium, asset markets clear and we obtain (1.18). Most
of what follows is basically the same as the solution in Greenwood and Vayanos (2014),
differing by a scaling constant. The arbitrageurs’ first order condition for bonds can be
written as
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The LHS of the equality is
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The RHS of the equality is
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Collect rt terms
A
′
r (τ) + Ar (τ)κr − 1 = As (τ) (A.5)
Collect st terms
A
′
s (τ) = 0 ⇒ As (τ) = Const. (A.6)
Before we collect the βt terms we note that the initial conditions, Ar (0) = As (0) =
Aβ (0) = C (0) = 0 so that Pt (0) = 1. In particular,
As (0) = 0 ⇒ As (τ) = 0 (A.7)
This simplifies the ODEs for Ar (τ) and Aβ (τ) significantly. For Ar(τ),
A
′
r (τ) + Ar (τ)κr − 1 = 0 (A.8)
⇒ Ar (τ) = 1− e
−κrτ
κr
(A.9)
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and for Aβ(τ),
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The solution to the Aβ (τ). For convenience, define
Z =aσ2rIr (A.11)
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So we have the simplified formulation
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics Of Key Variables
VARIABLES Units N mean sd min max
1Y Yield percent 672 5.24 3.38 0.10 16.72
ACM 10 Year Term Premium percent 667 1.65 1.20 -0.67 5.10
KW 10 Year Term Premium percent 318 0.88 0.89 -0.85 2.84
CP 3 Year Term Premium percent 612 1.23 2.23 -9.66 9.02
YC Slope (3 Year Minus 1 Year) percent 667 0.42 0.53 -2.11 1.66
Stock-Bond Correlation (DCC) decim. 672 0.10 0.15 -0.21 0.37
Stock-Bond Correlation (Rolling) decim. 672 0.05 0.30 -0.54 0.54
MWI decim. 670 0.36 0.17 0.09 0.85
WAM Issue year 671 2.28 0.74 0.76 3.80
Short Share decim. 671 0.68 0.13 0.45 0.99
WAM Stock year 672 7.99 1.63 4.72 11.13
Debt-GDP Ratio decim. 666 0.34 0.15 0.16 0.76
Note: 1Y Yield is the Treasury Constant Maturity 1 year zero coupon yield estimated by the Fed, which
I identify as the nominal short rate; ACM is the Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013) bond risk premium;
KW is the Kim and Wright (2005) bond risk premium; CP is the Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) bond
risk premium (Excess Return); MWI is the maturity-weighted sum of issuance to GDP ratio, which is the
baseline supply measure; WAM issue is the weighted average maturity of the issuance over the following
12 months; Short share is the share of the debt with maturity under 1 year in the total issuance over
12 months, which I use as an alternative measure for maturity choice; WAM Stock is the weight average
maturity of the entire stock of Treasuries outstanding at a given time; Debt-GDP ratio is ratio of the total
face value of all marketable Treasuries to nominal GDP.
where κˆβ solves the following expression
κˆβ = κβ − aσ2β
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A.2 Summary Statistics Table
A.3 Plots
The following plot Figure A.7 is taken from Hou (2018). It describes in greater richness
the dynamics of the US Treasury debt issuance policy. After encoding the issuance portfolio
in 5 maturity bins, I do a principal component analysis of the maturity structure of the
Treasury issuance. The first three principal components summarize about 90% of the
portfolio variability. About 45% of the movements of the portfolio is between adjustments
between the very short term (0-1year) and intermediate term (1-5year and 5-10year) and
the adjustments between the long term (10-20year) and the ultra-long term (>20year).
Another 30% of the variability comes from between short-medium term and long-ultra
long term.
A.4 Tables of Results
The following table shows that the baseline results are not changed by using a simple
moving window correlation. The share of short term debt is another measure of maturity
of new issuances. Table A.5 presents the results from the time series regressions. The
results are qualitatively very similar to those of WAM in table A.10. Since the higher the
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Figure A.1: Principal Components of US Treasury Debt Portfolio
Note: I define five maturity bins: 0 to 1 year, 1 to 5 years, 5 to 10 years, 10 to 20 years and above 20 years.
I describe the Treasury issuance portfolio by looking at the ratio of issuance in each maturity bin.
share of short term debt and smaller the weighted average maturity of issuance. Unless
there is some kind of systematic “curvature” in issuance like short term debt is regularly
issued in tandem with very long term debt as an alternative to medium term debt. In
the appendix I do a principal component analysis of the maturity structure of issuance.
About 52% of the all maturity structure choice is between maturity less than one year and
above. The regression results appear to confirm this. While there is a conditional positive
correlation between the term premium and WAM, there is similarly a conditional negative
correlation between term premium and short share. When the share of short term debt
goes from 0 to 100%, the term premium goes down by about 5 percent. Since the short
share has a mean of 68% and a standard deviation of 12%, this represents an economically
sizable effect.
The reason measures of maturity matter for term premium is that investors demand
extra compensation for holding long term bonds. It would be therefore natural to test
this hypothesis directly by regressing the term premium on the quantity of long term debt
issued. Because the quantity of long term has a trend over decades, I normalize the quan-
tity of new long term debt by nominal GDP. I define long term debt as Treasury having a
maturity greater or equal to 5 years. If the term premium is compensation for holding long
term bonds, we would expect positive coefficients on the long term debt quantity terms.
Indeed that’s what we find. For every percentage higher long term issuance as a share of
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Figure A.2: Average Maturity of Issuance and the Stock-Bond Return Correlation: 1951-2016
The data comes from Global Financial Data. Both the stock and bond returns are monthly returns. The stock
returns are total returns of the S&P 500 index and the bond returns are the holding period monthly returns
computed from the 10 year Treasury Constant Maturity yields.
nominal GDP is associated with about 0.8 to 0.9 percent higher term premium.
LongQuantt =
∑
n≥5y FV Oi,t≤s≤t+12m
NGDPt
(A.19)
A.5 The Non-Market Drivers of the US Debt Issuance Policy
A.5.1 Overview
As seen in Figure 1.2, the portfolio has gone through significant evolution over the
course of last century. Over time, the US federal government has taken on different levels
of debt (measured as a share of GDP) and significantly different composition. In this
paper, I am primarily focused on the maturity profile of the debt and am largely ignoring
the policy choices such as callability and other option features1 or indexation2 Over time,
the average maturity of government has significantly trended down while the absolute
1Until mid 1980s, the Treasury regularly issued callable bonds, which allows the Treasury to redeem the
bond prior to maturity. This option feature apart from clearly having implications on the value of the debt,
also means that the bond’s effective maturity may be shorter than the stated value. Since the Treasury rarely
actually exercised the call option on its debt, I have decided not to emphasize this particular feature.
2Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS), which are introduced in 1997, are offered in 5, 10 and
30 year maturities. The TIPS, which have grown significantly since inception, remain a small portion of the
overall Treasury debt portfolio ($1.2 trillion out of $13.9 trillion marketable debt). While indexation affects
the market value of the debt, it does not directly affect maturity of the debt.
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Figure A.3: Short Share and Ten Year Term Premium
Short Share: 12 month ahead share of short term (maturity ≤ 1 year) debt; TP10: Current ten year term
premium from Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013).
quantity of the debt has grown exponentially. There are distinctly two paradigms. Up until
the end of world world two (or pre-war era henceforth), the US government debt was
less regular or well-structured. It tends to consist mostly of one-off long term bonds to
finance specific expenditures such as the war or the Panama canal project. Between 1917
and the end of world war two, Congress gradually delegated increasingly more borrowing
power to the Treasury within the debt limit3 Since the end of the war, the US Treasury
debt management has gradually modernized and the portfolio too has stabilized. Because
of the burgeoning and persistent borrowing need, the Treasury has come to increasingly
rely on frequent auctions of short term debt4. Since the late 70s, the Treasury has also
officially given up on tactical issuance and transitioned towards a policy of “regular and
predictable”, where the Treasury would conduct regular prescheduled auctions of debt
securities, actively solicit market demand information and choreograph supply schedules.
As can be seen in 1.2, the postwar Treasury debt portfolio tends to consist of substantially
more short- and medium-term debt with relatively stable portfolio weights. Nevertheless
there is still substantial and systematic variability in the debt portfolio over time. In fact,
I will show that the debt issuance robustly responds to rollover risk and average maturity
of the debt stock but not to market prices or expectation of market prices.
3While Congress has continued to set a limit or ceiling on the aggregate quantity of debt the Treasury
can take on, it has also periodically raised that ceiling whenever it was about to be breached. Since 2001,
the debt limit has been raised 15 times with intermittent political crisis threatening failure to raise the debt
limit.
4Garbade, the Birth of a market
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Figure A.4: Long Quant and Ten Year Term Premium
Long Quant: 12 month ahead sum of long term (≥ 5 year) debt as a share of nominal GDP; TP10: Current
ten year term premium from Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013).
A.5.2 Regression Analysis of Government Issuance Policy
I test the cost minimization model of debt management using predictive regressions.
Specifically, I predict measures of Treasury issuance policy choice with contemporaneous
variables. Because Treasuries of different maturities are auctioned on different schedules,
in particular shorter maturity debt is auctioned more frequently than longer maturity debt,
issuance policy stance can be only be accurately gauged from looking over a period of
time. For this reason, a contemporaneous regression is not feasible: it’s either regression
on past or future information. I have chosen a predictive specification because I believe
it best mimics the problem faced by policymakers at the US Treasury. This specification
is equivalent to asking the Treasury officials to make a complete issuance schedule for
the following year using current market and macro information. I begin by looking at
weighted average maturity of new debt issues.
A.6 Alternative Measures of Maturity Structure
WAMt =
∑N
i FV Oi,t≤s≤t+12m ·Maturityi,t≤s≤t+12m∑N
i FV Oi,t≤s≤t+12m
(A.20)
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Table A.2: Regression on MWI: Rolling Corr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5
MWI 1.348 2.385*** 3.000*** 3.083*** 3.001***
(0.910) (0.753) (0.512) (0.502) (0.523)
Stock-Bond Corr 1.908*** -1.205 -1.532 -1.396
(0.585) (0.969) (1.079) (1.133)
MWI x Corr 7.763*** 6.788*** 7.816***
(1.857) (2.034) (1.870)
1Y Yield 0.081*
(0.044)
Sign 0.107
(0.368)
Constant 0.621** 0.153 0.075 -0.367 0.015
(0.294) (0.331) (0.235) (0.378) (0.295)
Observations 655 655 655 655 655
Adjusted R-squared 0.07 0.35 0.50 0.53 0.50
Newey-West HAC standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TP5 is the 5 year statistical term premium from Adrian, Crump
and Moench (2013); MWI is the maturity-weighted issuance to
NGDP ratio; Stock-Bond Corr is the 5 Year moving correlation
of month returns of the S&P 500 index and the 10 year Trea-
sury bond index; 1Y Yield is the Treasury constant maturity 1
year nominal yield.
An alternative measure of maturity structure is looking at the share of short term debt in
the total amount of debt issued in the following 12 months. I define short term debt as
securities with a maturity less than a year.
ShortSharet =
∑
n≤1y FV Oi,t≤s≤t+12m∑
i FV Oi,t≤s≤t+12m
(A.21)
Because the Treasury regularly rolls over maturing debts, new issuance is really a sum of
maturing debt and new issuances financing new deficits. Since I am looking at issuances
within a short horizon, most of the maturing debt will be either Treasury bills or highly
illiquid long term bonds with very short time to maturity. Longer weighted average matu-
rity of new issuances therefore also means greater amount of new long term bonds needs
to be absorbed. The same goes for short term share.
I focus on the Treasury new issuances as measure of Treasury policy between 1951 and
2016. At the outset, because issuance maturity choice is highly multi-dimensional, it is not
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Table A.3: 12-Month Overlapping Monthly Regressions: Short Share and Correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5
Short (0-1y) Share -2.163* -3.757*** -3.706*** -3.685*** -3.723***
(1.233) (0.837) (0.719) (0.672) (0.748)
Stock-Bond Corr 2.026*** 7.400*** 6.188*** 7.192***
(0.544) (1.823) (2.080) (1.837)
Short Share x Corr -8.557*** -7.432** -8.871***
(2.877) (3.143) (3.017)
TCM 1Y 0.054
(0.044)
Sign 0.261
(0.326)
Constant 2.585*** 3.573*** 3.670*** 3.376*** 3.538***
(0.938) (0.601) (0.530) (0.543) (0.559)
Observations 655 655 655 655 655
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.41 0.49 0.51 0.49
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The data ranges between 1961 and 2015. Column 1-4 are overlap-
ping monthly regressions. Column (5) is nonoverlapping annual re-
gressions. The dependent variable is the five year zero coupon term
premium from Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013). Short sh is the
sum (by face value) of securities with maturity less or equal to 1 year
as a share of all new securities issued in the following 12 months. I
express short share in decimals so that an increment of 1 is 100%. I
have kept it in this somewhat awkward unit to make the coefficients
more readily comparable to that of the sign of the stock-bond return
correlation. The sign of the stock-bond return correlation is derived
from the 5 year returns correlations. It takes the value of 1 if the cor-
relation is positive. This corresponds to roughly between 1965-2000.
TCM 1 year is the Treasury constant maturity 1 year yield from the
Federal Reserve.
clear which empirical measures should be used. For example, when the government wants
to issue more net debt to finance a certain deficit, it could issue uniformly across maturities
or let a certain amount of short term debt mature while issuing some long term debt or it
could even let a certain amount of short term debt and maturing long term debt mature
and issue a certain amount of medium term debt. In order to capture the dynamics of the
vectors of portfolio weights, I apply a principal component analysis to the bond issuance.
I divide up the issuance into five maturity bins: 0 to 1 year, 1 to 5 years, 5-10 years, 10-20
years and more than 20 years. I define the issuance shares on a monthly basis by the
shares of new debt securities issued within a given maturity bin as a share of total amount
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Table A.4: 12-Month Overlapping Monthly Regressions: Short Share and Sign of Correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5
Short Share -1.836 -5.702*** 0.084 -0.661 -0.422
(1.247) (1.048) (1.143) (1.300) (1.008)
Short Share x Sign Dummy -5.786*** -4.604*** -4.582***
(1.542) (1.743) (1.129)
TCM 1 Year 0.063 0.036
(0.048) (0.031)
Sign of Stock-Bond Corr 4.884*** 3.800*** 3.896***
(1.141) (1.344) (0.934)
Constant 2.329** 5.433*** 0.549 0.876 0.803
(0.947) (0.859) (0.745) (0.781) (0.579)
Observations 667 426 667 667 55
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.41
Newey-West HAC standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The data ranges between 1961 and 2015. Column 1-4 are overlapping
monthly regressions. Column (5) is nonoverlapping annual regressions. The
dependent variable is the five year zero coupon term premium from Adrian,
Crump and Moench (2013). Short sh is the sum (by face value) of securities
with maturity less or equal to 1 year as a share of all new securities issued in
the following 12 months. I express short share in decimals so that an incre-
ment of 1 is 100%. I have kept it in this somewhat awkward unit to make
the coefficients more readily comparable to that of the sign of the stock-bond
return correlation. The sign of the stock-bond return correlation is derived
from the 5 year returns correlations. It takes the value of 1 if the correlation
is positive. This corresponds to roughly between 1965-2000. TCM 1 year is
the Treasury constant maturity 1 year yield from the Federal Reserve.
of debt issued in the next 12 months. I use 12 months5 because that is a long enough of
a time period for every maturity to have a chance to be issued. The results are displayed
in figure A.7. The PCA results are not as easily interpretable as the PC analysis of the
term structure of interest rates, where components can be readily interpreted as “level”,
“slope” and “curvature”. Nevertheless, we can derive some significant insights. The first
principal component (PC) explains about 52% of variations in the issuance vectors. There
is a significant negative weight on 0-1 year and there are positive weights on all bins except
the medium long term bin (10-20 years). I interpret this as saying that about 50% of the
issuance policy is about trading off between very short term debt and long term debt. This
can be roughly interpreted as a “slope” factor between short (0-1 year) and long term debt
(>1 year) or a “level” factor for >1year debt. The second PC explains 21% of the issuance
vectors. There are significant weights on 5-10 years and 10-20 years. I interpret this as a
5I vary this time span to 6 month and 24 months, which I include in the appendix. The results remain
qualitatively unchanged.
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Table A.5: 12-Month Overlapping Monthly Regressions: Short Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5
(first) short sh -2.163* -3.747*** -0.227 -1.226 -0.970 -0.811
(1.233) (0.794) (1.098) (1.646) (1.256) (0.955)
Short sh x Stock-Bond Corr Sign -5.475*** -3.975* -4.303** -4.194***
(1.509) (2.337) (1.713) (1.068)
Sign of Stock-Bond Corr 4.639*** 3.100 3.569*** 3.609***
(1.116) (1.990) (1.323) (0.890)
(first) corr 5y nocrash 1.902*** 0.980
(0.458) (0.913)
TCM 1 Year 0.062 0.036
(0.049) (0.031)
Constant 2.585*** 3.557*** 0.794 1.722 1.120 1.091**
(0.938) (0.574) (0.704) (1.212) (0.738) (0.532)
Observations 655 655 655 655 655 54
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.44 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.41
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The data ranges between 1961 and 2015. Column 1-4 are overlapping monthly regres-
sions. Column (5) is nonoverlapping annual regressions. The dependent variable is the
five year zero coupon term premium from Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013). Short sh
is the sum (by face value) of securities with maturity less or equal to 1 year as a share
of all new securities issued in the following 12 months. I express short share in deci-
mals so that an increment of 1 is 100%. I have kept it in this somewhat awkward unit
to make the coefficients more readily comparable to that of the sign of the stock-bond
return correlation. The sign of the stock-bond return correlation is derived from the 5
year returns correlations. It takes the value of 1 if the correlation is positive. This cor-
responds to roughly between 1965-2000. TCM 1 year is the Treasury constant maturity
1 year yield from the Federal Reserve.
trade-off between a choice between issuing intermediate versus the very long term debt.
This can be interpreted roughly as a slope factor within the long (>1 year) debt. The third
PC explains 15% of the variations and has negative weights on 1-5year and >20year bins
and positive weights on 5-10year and 10-20year bins. The trade-off here is between very
short/ultra-long term debt and the intermediate/long-term debt. This factor resembles a
“curvature” factor for the long term (>1 year) debt where the Treasury could try to push
(or do the opposite) maturity towards the center (5-20) by issuing more in the middle
and less on the “edges” (1-5 and >20). The three factors taken together suggest that the
Treasury apart from deciding how much very short term debt (bills) to issue also tries
to manipulate the issuance patterns to achieve a certain maturity target. This exercise
confirms that it is reasonable to capture the Treasury’s debt policy by either looking at
short debt shares or the average maturity of debt issuance and potentially the higher order
moments such as the variance of issuance maturities.
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Figure A.5: Plots of Short Share and Long Quant
The short share is the share of the new issuances with maturity less or equal to 1 year to the total amount of
new issuances in the next 12 months. The long quant is the ratio between the total face value of long term
debt with maturity greater than 5 years as a share of the nominal GDP.
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Table A.6: 12-Month Overlapping Monthly Regressions: Long Quant and Correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5
Long quant 0.083 0.278** 0.585*** 0.587*** 0.590***
(0.148) (0.139) (0.119) (0.113) (0.125)
Stock-Bond Corr 1.768*** -0.872 -1.276 -1.258
(0.624) (0.851) (0.901) (1.214)
Long quant x Corr 1.709*** 1.542*** 1.740***
(0.424) (0.423) (0.442)
TCM 1Y 0.076
(0.047)
Sign of Corr 0.215
(0.457)
Constant 0.986*** 0.619** 0.370** -0.024 0.244
(0.242) (0.274) (0.188) (0.357) (0.308)
Observations 655 655 655 655 655
Adjusted R-squared 0.01 0.24 0.41 0.44 0.41
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The data ranges between 1961 and 2015. Column 1-4 are overlap-
ping monthly regressions. Column (5) is nonoverlapping annual re-
gressions. The dependent variable is the five year zero coupon term
premium from Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013). Long quant is the
sum of securities with maturity greater than 5 year as a share of nom-
inal GDP. I express long quant in percents. The sign of the stock-bond
return correlation is derived from the 5 year returns correlations. It
takes the value of 1 if the correlation is positive. This corresponds
to roughly between 1965-2000. TCM 1 year is the Treasury constant
maturity 1 year yield from the Federal Reserve.
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Table A.7: 12-Month Overlapping Monthly Regressions: Long Quant and Sign of Correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5
Long quant 0.046 0.954*** -0.037 0.065 0.061
(0.147) (0.264) (0.129) (0.157) (0.105)
Long quant x Sign Dummy 0.991*** 0.806*** 0.804***
(0.294) (0.297) (0.190)
TCM 1 Year 0.084 0.064
(0.054) (0.053)
Sign of Stock-Bond Corr -0.449 -0.567 -0.453***
(0.382) (0.398) (0.149)
Constant 1.014*** 0.227 0.676** 0.300 0.365
(0.243) (0.263) (0.284) (0.445) (0.378)
Observations 665 426 665 665 55
Adjusted R-squared 0.00 0.32 0.37 0.41 0.35
Newey-West HAC standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The data ranges between 1961 and 2015. Column 1-4 are overlap-
ping monthly regressions. Column (5) is nonoverlapping annual re-
gressions. The dependent variable is the five year zero coupon term
premium from Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013). Long quant is the
sum of securities with maturity greater than 5 year as a share of nom-
inal GDP. I express long quant in percents. The sign of the stock-bond
return correlation is derived from the 5 year returns correlations. It
takes the value of 1 if the correlation is positive. This corresponds
to roughly between 1965-2000. TCM 1 year is the Treasury constant
maturity 1 year yield from the Federal Reserve.
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Table A.8: 12-Month Overlapping Monthly Regressions: WAM of Issuance and Correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5
WAM 0.360 0.505*** 0.530*** 0.525*** 0.529***
(0.227) (0.182) (0.127) (0.124) (0.132)
Stock-Bond Corr 1.697*** -2.325* -2.422* -2.807**
(0.561) (1.191) (1.267) (1.412)
WAM x Corr 1.584*** 1.438*** 1.630***
(0.406) (0.444) (0.413)
TCM 1Y 0.050
(0.050)
Sign 0.233
(0.383)
Constant 0.286 -0.132 -0.094 -0.336 -0.223
(0.460) (0.460) (0.324) (0.434) (0.345)
Observations 655 655 655 655 655
Adjusted R-squared 0.08 0.33 0.45 0.47 0.46
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The data ranges between 1961 and 2015. Column 1-4 are overlap-
ping monthly regressions. Column (5) is nonoverlapping annual re-
gressions. The dependent variable is the five year zero coupon term
premium from Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013). WAM is the av-
erage maturity (weighted by face value) of the new securities issued
in the following 12 months with units in years. The sign of the stock-
bond return correlation is derived from the 5 year returns correla-
tions. It takes the value of 1 if the correlation is positive. This corre-
sponds to roughly between 1965-2000. TCM 1 year is the Treasury
constant maturity 1 year yield from the Federal Reserve.
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Table A.9: 12-Month Overlapping Monthly Regressions: WAM of Issuance and Sign of Correlatioin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5
WAM 0.303 0.931*** -0.154 -0.059 -0.110
(0.230) (0.192) (0.184) (0.228) (0.158)
WAM x Sign Dummy 1.085*** 0.927*** 0.932***
(0.265) (0.304) (0.164)
TCM 1 Year 0.053 0.023
(0.053) (0.039)
Sign of Stock-Bond Corr -1.656*** -1.541** -1.421***
(0.598) (0.635) (0.315)
Constant 0.383 -0.671* 0.985** 0.634 0.841*
(0.465) (0.373) (0.482) (0.677) (0.508)
Observations 667 426 667 667 55
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.38
Newey-West HAC standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The data ranges between 1961 and 2015. Column 1-4 are overlap-
ping monthly regressions. Column (5) is nonoverlapping annual re-
gressions. The dependent variable is the five year zero coupon term
premium from Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013). WAM is the av-
erage maturity (weighted by face value) of the new securities issued
in the following 12 months with units in years. The sign of the stock-
bond return correlation is derived from the 5 year returns correla-
tions. It takes the value of 1 if the correlation is positive. This corre-
sponds to roughly between 1965-2000. TCM 1 year is the Treasury
constant maturity 1 year yield from the Federal Reserve.
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Table A.10: 12-Month Overlapping Monthly Regressions: WAM of Issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5 TP5
WAM 0.360 0.495*** -0.109 -0.050 -0.015 -0.047
(0.227) (0.177) (0.183) (0.254) (0.229) (0.160)
WAM x Sign Dummy 1.040*** 0.943*** 0.884*** 0.868***
(0.264) (0.356) (0.305) (0.160)
Sign -1.592*** -1.605*** -1.473** -1.303***
(0.604) (0.613) (0.643) (0.315)
Corr 1.596*** 0.429
(0.469) (0.802)
TCM 1 Year 0.052 0.024
(0.054) (0.038)
Constant 0.286 -0.116 0.921* 0.907* 0.572 0.721
(0.460) (0.444) (0.490) (0.530) (0.692) (0.519)
Observations 655 655 655 655 655 54
Adjusted R-squared 0.08 0.35 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.37
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The data ranges between 1961 and 2015. Column 1-4 are overlapping monthly re-
gressions. Column (6) is nonoverlapping annual regressions. The dependent vari-
able is the five year zero coupon term premium from Adrian, Crump and Moench
(2013). WAM is the average maturity (weighted by face value) of the new securities
issued in the following 12 months with units in years. The sign of the stock-bond
return correlation is derived from the 5 year returns correlations. It takes the value
of 1 if the correlation is positive. This corresponds to roughly between 1965-2000.
TCM 1 year is the Treasury constant maturity 1 year yield from the Federal Reserve.
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Table A.11: Quarterly Issuance Regressions: 1961Q1-2015Q4 Using 2 Year Correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Short (0-1y) Share Average Maturity of Issuance
10Y Term Premium -0.038 -0.048*** -0.062*** -0.062*** 0.207 0.251** 0.303*** 0.304***
(0.024) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.132) (0.114) (0.113) (0.113)
TCM 1 Year 0.014* 0.014* -0.051 -0.051
(0.007) (0.007) (0.046) (0.046)
Sign of Stock-Bond Corr 0.130*** 0.072* 0.072* -0.588** -0.375 -0.375
(0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.276) (0.281) (0.281)
Tax Season Dummy 0.030*** -0.265***
(0.011) (0.091)
Constant 0.755*** 0.679*** 0.671*** 0.656*** 1.879*** 2.225*** 2.257*** 2.389***
(0.052) (0.050) (0.047) (0.048) (0.286) (0.309) (0.305) (0.308)
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.27 0.32 0.33 0.07 0.16 0.18 0.19
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
LHS variables are respectively one quarter forward the share of short term debt (maturity 1 year or less) and the
face value weighted average maturity of new debt issued. The regressors are contemporaneous observations.
Ten year term premium is from Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013). Treasury constant maturity 1 year interest
rate is used to proxy for the level of nominal interest rate. The sign of stock and bond returns is taken from the
sign of the 5 year moving average correlation between monthly stock returns and monthly bond returns. The
tax season dummy is one for the second and fourth quarters, when personal and corporate income tax receipts
come into the Treasury.
Table A.12: Quarterly Regressions of Issuance Maturity: 1961Q1-2015Q4 Using 5 Year Correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Short (0-1y) Share Average Maturity of Issuance
10Y Term Premium -0.038 -0.055*** -0.063*** -0.064*** 0.207 0.275** 0.315*** 0.316***
(0.024) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.132) (0.119) (0.113) (0.113)
TCM 1 Year 0.010 0.011 -0.049 -0.050
(0.008) (0.008) (0.052) (0.052)
Sign of Stock-Bond Corr 0.150*** 0.102* 0.102* -0.594* -0.371 -0.365
(0.051) (0.058) (0.058) (0.322) (0.377) (0.377)
Tax Season Dummy 0.029*** -0.262***
(0.011) (0.091)
Constant 0.755*** 0.680*** 0.671*** 0.657*** 1.879*** 2.181*** 2.220*** 2.349***
(0.052) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047) (0.286) (0.308) (0.304) (0.306)
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.07 0.16 0.17 0.19
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
LHS variables are respectively one quarter forward the share of short term debt (maturity 1 year or less) and the
face value weighted average maturity of new debt issued. The regressors are contemporaneous observations.
Ten year term premium is from Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013). Treasury constant maturity 1 year interest
rate is used to proxy for the level of nominal interest rate. The sign of stock and bond returns is taken from the
sign of the 5 year moving average correlation between monthly stock returns and monthly bond returns. The
tax season dummy is one for the second and fourth quarters, when personal and corporate income tax receipts
come into the Treasury.
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Table A.13: Monthly and Annual Regressions of Issuance Maturity Measures: 1961 Jan-2015 Dec Using 5 Year Correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Short (0-1y) Share Average Maturity of Issuance
Monthly Overlapping Annual Monthly Overlapping Annual
10Y Term Premium -0.037** -0.056*** -0.064*** -0.056*** 0.201* 0.278*** 0.316*** 0.281***
(0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.105) (0.097) (0.097) (0.078)
TCM 1 Year 0.010 -0.046
(0.007) (0.045)
Sign of Stock-Bond Corr 0.151*** 0.106** 0.153*** -0.640** -0.432 -0.643***
(0.040) (0.048) (0.031) (0.256) (0.316) (0.198)
Constant 0.748*** 0.674*** 0.665*** 0.674*** 1.931*** 2.245*** 2.285*** 2.231***
(0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.029) (0.221) (0.236) (0.238) (0.183)
Observations 655 655 655 54 655 655 655 54
Adjusted R-squared 0.12 0.40 0.43 0.39 0.10 0.25 0.27 0.23
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
LHS variables are respectively 12 months forward the share of short term debt (maturity 1 year or less)
and the face value weighted average maturity of new debt issued. Column 4 and column 8 are non-
overlapping annual regressions using fiscal years (Oct). Results are not qualitatively similar to using
calendar years. The regressors are contemporaneous observations. Ten year term premium is from
Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013). Treasury constant maturity 1 year interest rate is used to proxy for
the level of nominal interest rate. The sign of stock and bond returns is taken from the sign of the 5 year
moving average correlation between monthly stock returns and monthly bond returns.
Table A.14: Predictive Regression of WAM of Issuance: 1951-2016, Face Value of Debt Stock
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year 1951-2016 Year 1951-1983 Year 1983-2016 Year 1951-2016 Non-OL
VARIABLES WAM of Issuance WAM of Issuance WAM of Issuance WAM of Issuance
TCM 1 Year 0.394*** 0.290*** 0.217** 0.386***
(0.095) (0.094) (0.088) (0.086)
DGDP 0.869*** 1.025*** 0.609*** 0.863***
(0.088) (0.279) (0.071) (0.078)
WAM Stock -0.246*** -0.470*** -0.437*** -0.247***
(0.094) (0.136) (0.091) (0.083)
Constant 2.152*** 1.962*** 2.498*** 2.153***
(0.068) (0.137) (0.067) (0.058)
Observations 759 369 402 63
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.46 0.80 0.66
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The baseline regressions (column 1-3) are overlapping monthly predictive regressions.
The dependent variable is the weighted average maturity of debt issued in the following
12 months. The independent variables are the current nominal interest rate (Treasury con-
stant maturity 1 year), standardized marketable debt (face value) to GDP ratio, standard-
ized weighted average maturity of all outstanding debt. Because overlapping regressions
induce autocorrelation, I use Newey-West HAC standard errors. As a further check, I run
a non-overlapping annual regression. There are 12 ways of running an annual regression.
I display here the results from using fiscal year or Oct to Oct. Results from using calendar
year are very similar.
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Figure A.6: Plots of Ancillary Time Series Variables
TCM1Y is the one year Treasury constant maturity yield estimated by the Federal Reserve; WAM Stock is the
weighted average maturity of the stock of marketable debt outstanding; the debt to GDP ratio is the ratio
between the total face va value of the marketable debt and the nominal GDP.
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Figure A.7: Principal Components of US Treasury Debt Portfolio
I describe the Treasury debt issuance by first dividing new issues into five bins by maturity: 0 to 1 year, 1 to
5 years, 5 to 10 years, 10 to 20 years and above 20 years. I then calculate the quantity issued in each bin as a
share of the total quantity issued in the previous 12 months. The first three principal components summarize
about 90% of the portfolio variability. The first component (52% of issuance movements) consists of a choice
between very short term debt and medium or long term debt. The second component (21%) consists of a
choice between medium term (5-20 year) debt and short- or ultra-long term debt.
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APPENDIX B
Chapter II Supporting Material
B.1 Data Treatment
B.1.1 Mistakes and Missing Entries
The CRSP database contains, especially between 1955 and 1960, numerous instances
of errors, missing entries and other mistakes. I manually verify the CRSP datasets against
the MSPD records and manually correct any mistakes or missing entries. Furthermore, I
extend the CRSP Treasury database forward to 1919 by manually inputting the quantity
and other issue information of marketable Treasury securities from the MSPD. Old bond
prices prior to the start of the CRSP database or missing from the it are obtained from the
archival records of the Wall Street Journal.
The issuance dates are missing for many short-term securities such as Treasury bills,
tax-anticipation or cash-management bills. I recover the issuance dates by subtracting
duration (in days) from the maturity date wherever possible. And when the duration is
missing, I use the first quotation date in which the security appears.
The CRSP database/MSPD have some quirky data recording methodology. Because the
MSPD report is recorded at the end of each month, sometimes a new security issued at
the beginning of the next month is recorded in the previous month with a quantity of
zero. There are other times, when a security is mysteriously dropped a month before its
maturing month. I manually correct these.
B.1.2 Reopening Identification
In a security reopening, the Treasury issues additional amounts of of a previously is-
sued, typically long maturity, security. The reopening has the same maturity date and
coupon rate as that of the original security. Securities are sometimes reopened because the
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Treasury wants to add to some recently issued ultra-long-maturity securities and some-
times to support the market liquidity of these securities. Either way, reopenings reflect the
Treasury’s issuance decisions and should be properly identified. Because reopenings are
not separately reported in the database, I detail how I identify them here.
Because I do not have complete record of when the Treasury has done how much re-
openings, I must infer it from the history of quantity outstanding. If a security is not
reopened, the quantity outstanding should stay constant over the entire lifetime of a bond.
In other words, if quantity outstanding increases significantly during the course of a bond’s
lifetime, it must be due to reopening. I identify a reopening whenever the quantity out-
standing in a given period is more than 10% greater than the previous period. In practice,
I find that most of the increments are much bigger than 10%. I identify reopenings as new
individual securities. Sometimes, a single security has multiple reopenings and each is a
separate security as well. I checked that of the reopenings for which there is record since
2002, the identified reopened securities have a match rate of about 99%.
B.2 Empirical Analysis
B.2.1 VAR Analysis of Issuance Maturity
In this section I explain in detail the setup of the VAR model behind Figure (2.7). The
goal of the model is to estimate the dynamic response of the issuance maturity to the two
sources of funding needs, i.e., maturing debt-GDP ratio and the deficit-GDP ratio. In the
baseline, let
yt =
(MLD/GDP)t(Def/GDP)t
WAMt
 (B.1)
denote the time t value of the three variables: maturing debt to GDP ratio, deficit to GDP
ratio and the weighted average maturity of issuance. The VAR model can be stated as
follows.
A
(
I3 − A1L− A2L2 − · · · − ApLp
)
yt = Aεt = Bet (B.2)
where L is the lag operator and p is the number of lags. in the baseline, I assume p = 2 or
a lag order of 2. A, B, and A1, . . . , Ap are 3× 3 matrices of parameters. εt is a 3× 1 vector
of innovations with εt ∼ N (0,Σ) and E
[
εtε
′
s
]
= 03 for all s 6= t. et is a 3 × 1 vector of
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orthogonalized disturbances, that is et ∼ N (0, I3) and E
[
ete
′
s
]
= 03 for all s 6= t.
I obtain identification by imposing Cholesky restrictions on the VAR system by applying
equality constraints with the constraint matrices A and B defined as follows.
A =
 1 0 0· 1 0
· · 0
 , B =
 · 0 00 · 0
0 0 ·
 (B.3)
In the baseline, these structural restrictions represent the assumption that 1) the maturing
debt/GDP ratio does not respond contemporaneously to either the deficit/GDP ratio or
the weighted average maturity of issuance; 2) the deficit/GDP ratio may respond to the
maturing debt/GDP ratio but does not respond contemporaneously to the weighted aver-
age maturity of issuance; and 3) the weighted average maturity of issuance may respond
contemporaneously to both the maturing debt/GDP ratio and the deficit/GDP ratio. The
responses of the weighted average maturity of issuance are reported in Figure (2.7) and
the variables’ dynamic responses to own shocks are reported below in Figure (B.1).
I conduct a couple robustness checks of the VAR results. First, because the ordering of
the first two variables is admittedly somewhat arbitrary, I consider two separate models:
model a has the baseline ordering and model b swaps the ordering of the first two variables.
Specifically,
yAt =
(MLD/GDP)t(Def/GDP)t
WAMt
 , yBt =
 (Def/GDP)t(MLD/GDP)t
WAMt
 (B.4)
The results are presented in the first two columns of Figure (B.2). There is no visible
difference from using either ordering. Secondly, in the baseline the VAR model is estimated
with 2 lags. Given the autocorrelation structure or persistence in the WAM and the deficit
variables, I reestimate the model using 4 lags. The results are presented in the third column
of Figure (B.2), denoted as model C.
B.3 Mathematical Appendix
B.3.1 Solution of The Model
1. The risk-neutral case.
If γ = 0, as y¯1 < y¯2 and 0 < ψ < 1, cost of short-term borrowing is strictly lower. then
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Figure B.1: Impulse Responses to Own Shocks
This set of figures show the impulse responses of the three variables to their own shocks. Each step is a quarter.
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Figure B.2: Robust Checks of the VAR Results
This set of figures show the results from a couple robustness checks. The first two columns show the impulse responses of the weighted
average maturity of issuance to shocks to maturing debt/GDP and to deficit/GDP shocks in two different model specifications. The first
column depicts the results from model A ordering and the second column depicts results from model B ordering. There is no visible
difference between the two models. The third column shows the results of from using 4 lags instead of the baseline 2 lags as in model
A in the first column. Each step is a quarter.
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s∗ ≡ 1.
2. The ”perfectly elastic demand” case.
If γ > 0 and L¯ ≡ ∞ or if 1−s < `, then φ2 (s) ≡ 0. So the objective function becomes
min
s
s (y¯1 − h (δ)) + (1− s) (y¯2 − ψh (δ)) + γd(s− a)
2
2
· 1 {s > a} (B.5)
where
y1 = y¯1 − h (δ) (B.6)
y2 = y¯2 − ψh (δ) , ψ ∈ (0, 1) (B.7)
Note that the s∗ ≥ a. This is because if s∗ < a, interest rate costs can be reduced
by borrowing more short term debt without incurring any rollover risk disutility. If
s∗ ≥ a, (issue more short-term debt at the expense of greater roll-over risk) the
objective function is
V2 = s (y¯1 − h (δ)) + (1− s) (y¯2 − ψh (δ)) + γd(s− a)
2
2
(B.8)
And the optimal amount of short term debt is
s∗ =
(y¯2 − ψh (δ))− (y¯1 − h (δ))
γd
+ a (B.9)
3. The downward-sloping demand case.
In this case L¯ < D < ∞. Assume further that 0 < a < 1 − `. So in this case, the
demand curve for long-term bonds is downward-sloping.
min
s
sy1 + (1− s) y2 + γd(s− a)
2
2
(B.10)
y1 = y¯1 − h (δ) (B.11)
y2 = y¯2 + φ2 (1− s− `) · 1 {1− s > `} · d− ψh (δ) (B.12)
The downward-sloping demand curve only kicks in if we issue more than 1 − s > `
amount of long-term debt or less than s < 1−` amount of short-term debt. Therefore
the following has to hold for the downward-sloping demand curves to matter.
` < 1− a− (y¯2 − y¯1) + h (δ) (1− ψ)
γd
(B.13)
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If the long-term debt trigger is too high, it wouldn’t bind. The downward-sloping
demand curve binds only if sufficiently small. Therefore, assume the above is true,
so the new objective function is
s (y¯1 − h (δ)) + (1− s) (y¯2 + φ2 (1− s− `) d− ψh (δ)) + γd(s− a)
2
2
(B.14)
And the solution then becomes
s∗ =
(y¯2 − ψh (δ))− (y¯1 − h (δ))
(2φ2d+ γd)
+
φ2 (1− `) + φ2 + γa
(2φ2 + γ)
(B.15)
When φ2 = 0, s∗ reduces to the perfectly elastic case. Let’s quickly verify that this
is indeed bigger than the short-term debt share under the perfectly elastic demand
case.
(y¯2 − ψh (δ))− (y¯1 − h (δ))
(2φ2d+ γd)
+
φ2 (1− `) + φ2 + γa
(2φ2 + γ)
>
(y¯2 − ψh (δ))− (y¯1 − h (δ))
γd
+ a
(B.16)
⇐⇒ ` < 2
(
1− a− (y¯2 − ψh (δ))− (y¯1 − h (δ))
γd
)
(B.17)
which is indeed the case.
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APPENDIX C
Chapter III Supporting Material
C.1 Figures
Figure C.1: Average CAR and CAV Around Earnings Announcements By Announcement Types
This figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal volume by different types of earnings announcements in a
20-day window. As mentioned in section (3.3.1), in Finland each stock has four main earnings announcements in a year. One (annual)
financial statement release and three (quarterly) interim earnings reports. CAR.all and CAV.all repeat the unconditional premium and
volume as in Figure (3.1). CAR.fs and CAV.fs represent the return and volume averaged over only financial statement events. CAR.irs
and CAV.irs represent the return and volume averaged over only interim report events. Volume and return are in percent.
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Figure C.2: Average CAR and CAV Around Earnings Announcements By Announcement Types
This figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal volume by different types of earnings announcements in a
40-day window. As mentioned in section (3.3.1), in Finland each stock has four main earnings announcements in a year. One (annual)
financial statement release and three (quarterly) interim earnings reports. CAR.all and CAV.all repeat the unconditional premium and
volume as in Figure (3.1). CAR.fs and CAV.fs represent the return and volume averaged over only financial statement events. CAR.irs
and CAV.irs represent the return and volume averaged over only interim report events. Volume and return are in percent.
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Figure C.3: Average CAR and CAV Around Earnings Announcements By Announcement Types
This figure depicts the unconditional premium and volume around all earnings announcements in a 40-day window. Market CAR and
Market CAV are the same CAR.fs and CAV.fs as in Figure(3.3) respectively. Ind.Cum.Netbuy represents the trading imbalance on the
announcing stock by the individual investors as defined in equation (3.7). Inst.Cum.Netbuy represents the trading imbalance on the
announcing stock by the institutional investors as defined in equation (3.8).
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Figure C.4: Average CAR and CAV Around Earnings Announcements By Announcement Types
This figure depicts the unconditional premium and volume around financial statements in a 20-day window. Market CAR and Market
CAV are the same CAR.fs and CAV.fs as in Figure(3.3) respectively. Ind.Cum.Netbuy represents the trading imbalance on the announcing
stock by the individual investors as defined in equation (3.7). Inst.Cum.Netbuy represents the trading imbalance on the announcing
stock by the institutional investors as defined in equation (3.8).
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Figure C.5: Average CAR and CAV Around Earnings Announcements By Announcement Types
This figure depicts the unconditional premium and volume around financial statements in a 40-day window. Market CAR and Market
CAV are the same CAR.fs and CAV.fs as in Figure(3.3) respectively. Ind.Cum.Netbuy represents the trading imbalance on the announcing
stock by the individual investors as defined in equation (3.7). Inst.Cum.Netbuy represents the trading imbalance on the announcing
stock by the institutional investors as defined in equation (3.8).
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C.2 Statistical Tables
Table C.1: T-stats For CAR and CAV Around Earnings Announcements
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Table C.2: T-stats For CAR and CAV Around Only Financial Statements
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Table C.3: T-stats For CAR and CAV Around Only Interim Earnings Reports
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Table C.4: T-stats For Cumulative Net-Buy Around Earnings Announcements
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Table C.5: T-stats For Cumulative Net-Buy Around Only Financial Statements
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Table C.6: T-stats For Cumulative Net-Buy Around Interim Earnings Reports
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